



FINAL REPORT

MAYOR'S COMMISSION

ON

CIVIL DISORDER

AUGUST 15, 1968

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

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FOREWORD

On May 4, 1968, Mayor Ilus W. Davis appointed this Commission on Civil Disorder. He requested that the Commission study the severe civil disturbance that occurred in Kansas City during the week of April 8, 1968 and make a report to the people of Kansas City which would answer three questions:

- a. What are the pertinent facts that preceded and brought about the civil disturbance?
- b. What are the facts connected with the civil disturbance itself?
- c. What recommendations can be made for the prevention of this type of disorder and for the establishment of harmonious relations among the people of this city?

In seeking information in these three question areas, the Commission has conducted approximately 250 individual interviews requiring a minimum of an hour each. The Commission has reviewed lengthy local TV news films and radio tape recordings; has studied dozens of documents and reports of both local and national significance; and has conducted two surveys in an attempt to determine pertinent attitudes of people within the black as well as the white community in Kansas City. It is estimated that in addition to the work of staff members, each Commissioner has devoted perhaps 400 hours of his personal time to the work of the Commission.

This report then is the result of extensive investigation, comprehensive consideration of the evidence, and lengthy deliberation and discussion. It represents the Commission's best efforts to carry out the charge given by Mayor Davis at the time he appointed the Commission. What follows are the facts of the disturbance as found by the Commission from the preponderance of the evidence; comments and conclusions based upon these facts; comments on the Police Department, Board of Education, City Government and other areas of concern; and recommendations for the prevention

of future disorders and for the establishment of harmonious relations among the people of Kansas City.

The Commission has worked under severe pressures in attempting to adequately deal with such an important and far-reaching subject in a comparatively short period of time. It has operated with limited financial resources and its staff has consisted of an Executive Director (whose time was donated by his employer, Midwest Research Institute), one paid research investigator, and a secretary. Deep appreciation goes to those who have donated office space as well as other facilities, and to those hundreds of individuals who gave of their time to supply the Commission with vital information through interviews, written reports, and otherwise. The Commission has received and greatly appreciates the full cooperation of the various agencies of City government, the Kansas City Police Department, the Board of Education, and the news media, among other institutions. Without the help of these individuals and organizations, the complex task undertaken by the Commission would have been impossible.

INTRODUCTION

The Commission's investigation has convinced its members that of more importance than immediate events or precipitating causes of the April riots is the existence of conditions that produce and increase tensions, unrest and frustrations in the Negro community, and which result in the emotional climate which is necessary before a riot can occur. The prevention of the type of disorders which occurred here, and the establishment of harmonious relations among the people of this City, can effectively be accomplished only by correcting the conditions that need correcting and improving the conditions that need improving. The realization of this has led the Commission into fields which are admittedly beyond its competence and which clearly require more extensive time and study than has been available to this Commission. Consequently, while most of the Commission's recommendations made in this report are specific, others should be the subject of study and investigation in depth by persons qualified in the areas referred to, such as education, housing, city services, jobs, etc.

Of necessity, the Commission's recommendations are based on the assumption that if the needs are understood and appreciated, adequate funds to meet such needs will somehow be secured. If such is not the case, there would appear to be little hope for real progress.

The Commission sincerely hopes that those reading this report will be ever mindful of the fact that both its criticisms and commendations are meant to be constructive only, not just "second guessing," to the end that experiences of the past can become lessons for the future. We have been constantly aware that hindsight is always better than foresight, particularly when the foresight in the handling of Kansas City's riot often permitted virtually no time for deliberation before action, while the hindsight is based on weeks of study and deliberation.

If the lessons are learned well and the needs of the com-

munity diligently pursued, the Commission feels that Kansas City can move forward progressively toward the harmonious human relations desired by all, under the leadership that can be provided by the present chief executive officers of the City, Police Department, and Board of Education. They, of course, must have the help and cooperation of civic, civil rights, business, and other leaders and groups in the community.

Every observation, statement, and comment in this report should be read in the light of the complete conviction of the Commission that there must be universal respect for law and order. Absence of law and order can lead to anarchy; but it is equally important that law and order must be accompanied with justice. Real peace and harmony cannot be accomplished merely by force of arms. There must be equal justice under the law. Violence cannot be sanctioned. It must be stopped. Rioters as well as other law violators must be arrested, tried, and convicted. Likewise, the police and other law enforcement officers are responsible for their acts, and are equally subject to the rule of law. If they exceed the legally authorized bounds of firmness and self-protection, they, too, should be disciplined or tried and convicted.

First priority must be given to the determination of conditions where the roots of violence may be growing in fertile ground. These conditions must be changed. But when violence does erupt, superior force must be used to restore peace to the community. The function of government is to govern.

THE FACTS

The Commission exerted considerable effort to determine the facts of the civil disorder. To relate all the information gained from the hundreds of interviews would require a lengthy volume which few people would take the time to read. Therefore, for the sake of brevity and readability, we seek to maintain a theme, and properly emphasize the pertinent facts without relating all the incidents which occurred before and during the week of Martin Luther King's funeral. These are those facts as indicated by the preponderance of evidence received by the Commission.

a. Events before April 9, 1968

"A civil disorder will not occur except where there is a long history of social tensions which have festered over time, and which allow the final spark to grow into a riot." So said one leading citizen of Kansas City. Like many other cities in America, there has been a history of social tension in Kansas City. While the Negro population of the City approximates the percentage of the Negro population in the entire United States, between 16% and 18%, the Negro population of the Kansas City School District now approaches 45%. Kansas City has experienced an increase in crime rate, particularly in the so-called inner-city which is largely inhabited by Negroes.

Moreover, as is often the case nationally, there has existed in the Negro community of Kansas City a history of complaints against the Police Department and the school system. Complaints against the Police Department usually charge physical and verbal abuse of Negro citizens, discriminatory employment and promotion practices, and lack of adequate channels for processing complaints against the actions of individual police officers. There also has existed among Kansas City Negroes a feeling that many in the white community favored discrimination against Negroes, and the nominal support given by the white community in the 1964

from my testimony

Public Accommodations vote is used as evidence of this feeling. On the other hand, some Kansas City Negroes have made considerable progress, particularly in the political area. Negroes hold positions on the City Council, the Municipal Court, the School Board, the Board of Police Commissioners, the State Legislature, and a Negro is Clerk of the Jackson County Circuit Court. But, despite this definite progress, conditions toward the lower end of the socio-economic scale in the Negro community seem actually to have become worse.

Several significant attempts have been made in recent years to identify and analyze problems of the various institutions in this City. The Board of Police Commissioners contracted with the Public Administration Service of Chicago in 1965 to evaluate the management and operation of the Police Department, and prepare broad plans for improving police services. Many of the recommendations of the study have been implemented promptly, but the matter of police-community relations was not a part of the study.

Attempts were made to identify and solve important problems within the Kansas City School System. One of these was the so-called Havighurst Report of November, 1965. From that report the middle school concept was proposed, and the lack of action on the recommendations of that report is a matter of which the Negro community is acutely aware.

During 1967, several incidents occurred which may have been a prelude to April, 1968. On July 4, 1967, police attempted to stop an illegal bootlegging operation being conducted at Swope Park for the holiday picnickers. The situation was ominous, several arrests were made, but violence did not result. On another occasion, excitement generated by an exceedingly large Negro crowd at a local radio station talent show almost caused trouble when it became necessary to prematurely close the show. Within the school system, the school year 1967-68 saw an increase in the level of tension, particularly at the predominantly Negro high schools and junior high schools. In the fall, fights at the schools, often involving non-students as well as students, became commonplace. In November, 1967, a disturbance at Central High

School was dealt with by 35 policemen in fifteen police cars. Rocks and bottles were thrown at policemen and their cars, and twelve arrests were made. School principals in the inner-city requested increased police protection at their schools.

The job program of 1967 had become inactive in September. Half of the money raised by the Chamber of Commerce and the Civic Council, both of Greater Kansas City, for this program was in fact not spent, but saved for future use.

The important position of Executive Secretary of the Human Relations Commission of Kansas City was left vacant for a period of 12 months, from June 1967 to June 1968.

Despite the frequently expressed feeling by City officials, many Negro leaders, and other Kansas Citians, that riots and violence could not happen in Kansas City as it had elsewhere, the Police Department studied other cities where riots had occurred, engaged in extensive riot control training, and secured equipment for riot control use.

In February of 1968, the Police Department opened two store front offices in the Negro community for non-law enforcement, community relations activities.

On March 27, 1968, an unusual fight occurred on the school grounds of Central High School and Central Junior High. An ordinary fight become quite ominous when carloads of non-students suddenly arrived. School principals noted increasing tensions, and requested that two Negro police officers be assigned to the area. They also suggested that the dismissal hours of Central Senior and Central Junior High Schools be staggered so as to avoid having so many students released at the same time. Police officers were so assigned, but the dismissal hours at Central were not staggered.

In early April, the atmosphere was tense in Memphis, Tennessee. A protest march in support of striking garbage workers resulted in violence and the death of one Negro youth on March 28. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., returned to Memphis on April 3 to lead a second massive protest march. Then on the early evening of April 4, while standing on the balcony of the second floor of the Lorraine Motel,

Dr. King was struck by an assassin's bullet and at 7:00 p.m. was pronounced dead. A curfew was immediately placed in effect and 4,000 Tennessee National Guardsmen were ordered to duty. Scattered violence erupted. Shortly thereafter in Boston, a large crowd of young Negroes stoned six police cruisers in the Roxbury area. In Raleigh, North Carolina, police clashed with thirty young Negroes. In Harlem, there was looting and burning. In Washington, D. C., crowds of Negroes gathered in predominantly Negro shopping areas, and there was extensive looting and burning. A meaningful and magnetic link between whites and blacks was broken with the death of Dr. King, a disciple of non-violence. President Johnson immediately postponed his departure to Honolulu and addressed the nation, pleading for harmony. But harmony was not to be, for over the next four days in 130 United States cities and towns, 39 people died in 13 cities, 2,500 other individuals were injured, and over \$45,000,000 in property damage occurred. 1,400 arrests were made, and troops were called into 17 cities.

But on that Thursday evening in Kansas City, police intelligence indicated that there was more an atmosphere of stunned shock than a real threat of violence in the Negro community. Among the youth though, there was a feeling of anger. One said: "There are going to be a lot of changes, a whole lot of changes." At about 9:00 p.m. that evening a Negro minister called for a meeting at his church to begin planning a memorial march to be held the following Sunday afternoon. At 10:30 a.m. the next morning, several Negro leaders met with representatives of the Police Department to discuss plans for this march, including the route desired, and the parade permit.

A check was made on Friday of the Kansas City, Missouri School System, but there appeared to be no indication of trouble, as students were perhaps quieter than usual. The flags of the various schools were lowered to half-mast by midday.

But things were different in Kansas City, Kansas. At one high school which has a minority of black students, the flag was lowered to half-mast, and then these students marched

to a second high school which is predominantly Negro. Other students gathered at this school, and official word of these events was then passed to the Mayor of the city by the Superintendent of Schools. The Mayor and the Chief of Police began coordinating their plans for cooperation with the School Administration and local Negro leadership. At the high school an assembly was begun, and before it was concluded the ranking Negro police officer and ten other Negro officers were brought into the auditorium. The students indicated a strong desire to march downtown to City Hall, and officials felt that a daytime march might release emotions. The police indicated they would assist the student march, but students were requested to select their own leaders.

As the march began only black officers were used to assist. White officers were kept at a distance. No anti-riot equipment was in evidence. The number of marchers was estimated at 1,500 to 2,000 young people. En route to City Hall, normal traffic proceeded in the opposite direction of the march, and some car hoods were pounded. While fear was indicated by white people swept up into the march, no major damage occurred. Negro clergy were involved in the march and assisted the police from the beginning.

At City Hall the Mayor spoke to the students, and thereafter several other speakers addressed the crowd, praising the orderliness of the march and indicating respect for Dr. King. Sometime later the ranking Negro officer told the crowd that the event was over, and the marchers were directed back to the schools. Some marchers did break off as they were returning to the schools, went into stores, and did some very minor looting.

On Friday evening Police Chief Clarence Kelley returned from Florida and immediately thereafter a riot control practice tactical alert, Phase II, was called. This plan requires an all-out mobilization of the Police Department with 12-hour shifts for all personnel. The results of this practice indicated that 79% of the police force was available for duty, a satisfactory result for a Friday evening.

During the day Saturday, April 6th, planning continued

for the memorial march to be held the following day. Also, a joint announcement was prepared for Mayor McDowell and Mayor Davis, asking business leaders to allow their employees to pause for one minute of silent meditation at 9:30 on Tuesday morning, the time of the Martin Luther King funeral. Saturday afternoon, Superintendent of Schools James Hazlett returned to Kansas City and conferred with his staff on two matters: (1) the naming of the new junior high school for Dr. Martin Luther King, and (2) the advisability of holding school on Tuesday. The decision was to hold school on Tuesday, with one minute of silent meditation at 9:30 a.m., the time of the funeral. This decision was apparently made by the Superintendent in consultation with one of his staff members.

On Sunday, April 7th, preceding the memorial march, there was a lengthy television forum with Mayor Davis and Mayor McDowell, as well as many civil rights leaders, participating. The younger and more militant Negroes did not participate. At 1:30 p.m. the memorial march and service for Dr. Martin Luther King was held. Estimates of the number of marchers ranged from 5,000 to 15,000 people. There was talk by some in the crowd about starting a disturbance. A minor incident did occur at the Isis Theater near 31st and Troost, but it was quickly handled by the police. It was later learned that some of the younger Negroes felt they had little opportunity to plan or become a real part of this memorial march. The police, although out in large numbers, remained inconspicuous.

Later that afternoon, Superintendent Hazlett and his staff prepared a press release announcing that the new junior high school would be named for Dr. King, and that school would be held on Tuesday, with a one minute meditation out of respect for Dr. King. The Superintendent then left for the East where he served as Chairman in Washington, D. C., of an advisory committee on the use of federal funds for educational purposes.

Sometime during that week end, there was discussion among the school-aged children both in Missouri and Kansas. The idea of a march on Tuesday by the students was de-

veloped, because the Kansas City, Missouri children wanted to have a march similar to that conducted by the students of Kansas City, Kansas, the previous Friday.

At least one teacher close to the students learned Monday morning of the possibility of a march on Tuesday. He called to discuss this matter with a school official at the Board of Education. This began a series of discussions between Negro civil rights leaders and some School Board administrators. The decision had been made over the week end to hold school on Tuesday, while having one minute of silent meditation at the time of Dr. Martin Luther King's funeral. In these conversations there was some divided opinion, but the majority felt that it would be better to keep the children off the streets and under the supervision of their school teachers. It was decided to broaden the memorial service from one minute of silent meditation to a school assembly.

During the day, Kansas City, Kansas school officials indicated to their counterparts in Missouri that the Kansas schools were getting considerable pressure from civil rights groups, including a threat from one organization that the schools would be boycotted if classes were conducted on Tuesday. Several parents, including one prominent civil rights leader with a great interest in education, telephoned the Board of Education office advising that a march was being planned by the Missouri students for the following day. These people were told by School Board administrators that other civil rights leaders had been contacted and there was general agreement that the schools be kept open.

Meanwhile, at 4:15 p.m. in Kansas City, Kansas, a meeting was held in the library with the Superintendent of Schools, principals of the various high schools, the Chief of Police, the Police Human Relations Division, and the ranking Negro officer in the Police Department. It was in this meeting that a final decision was made to close the schools on the following day. This information was then transmitted to the Kansas City, Missouri School Board administrators.

After a brief effort to get the Kansas decision reversed, Kansas City, Missouri school officials again contacted numerous civil rights leaders. The majority still agreed classes

should be held on the following day. Announcement of the Kansas City, Kansas, school closing was made public over radio and TV stations early that evening. Concern mounted regarding the decision to have school on the following day, but the Superintendent of Schools was still out of town and the President of the School Board could not be contacted by telephone.

While School Board administrators wrestled with the decision to hold classes on the following day, other meetings were being held. Negro professional athletes began preparation for involvement in school assemblies scheduled for the following day. School children themselves asked businesses along 31st Street to close in honor of Dr. King at the time of his funeral. Inside the high schools and junior high schools, plans progressed for the assemblies, and there was at least one meeting among ministers and Negro civil rights leaders because there was a feeling by some that trouble was brewing. During the night on Monday, seven fires occurred in which there was a suspicion of arson. All were in the vicinity of 23rd to 26th Street, and Benton Boulevard to Prospect Avenue.

b. April 9, 1968

On Tuesday, April 9th, the nation awakened to pay its last respects to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. That was the dominant news on the KPRS radio newscast at 7:30 a.m., but a list of schools that were to be closed for the day and schools that were to be open for classes as usual was also announced. Immediately following the newscast, the radio station received a telephone call from Lincoln High School, indicating that the school walkout would commence shortly thereafter, and the march of students would proceed from Lincoln High School to Central High School. Also at 7:30 a.m., a regular Police Command Officer staff meeting was conducted, and one officer noted the fact that classes were to be out in Kansas, but schools would be open in Missouri. Another officer reported the seven fires of suspicious origin which occurred the previous night.

At Lincoln and Manual High Schools, groups of students

lingered outside the buildings after the first bell rang. At Manual, the students marched into the building through the Forest Street entrance and out the Tracy Street entrance, in a quiet and orderly manner. They proceeded to 16th and Lydia, where they were joined by students from Lincoln. The march began toward Central High School with considerable enthusiasm, but no real unruliness. In fact, the group stopped on two occasions to pose for pictures. At this point in the morning there was some question as to the ultimate destination of the students. Some indicated they would like to proceed after Central High School to Paseo High School, then find a suitable place for a memorial ceremony. Others indicated they would like to march downtown to the Board of Education as a protest of the fact that school was to be held in Kansas City, Missouri.

At this point, ministers identified with the civil rights movement were preparing for a 9:30 a.m. memorial service conducted by the Metropolitan Inter-Church Agency. Several of the political leaders identified with the civil rights movement were preparing for a ceremony to be held at the County Court House, but at least one civil rights leader learned of rumors of the march, and contacted one of the school principals whose students were in the march. This principal indicated that the march was a police matter, and not a problem for the schools. Two Negro civil rights leaders in a car equipped with a loud speaker proceeded to join the march, and a few non-students also joined it prior to the arrival of the group at Central High School. Rumors began circulating in the community about the march, and the telephones at both the Police Department and the Board of Education soon became overloaded.

At Central High School and Central Junior High School before school opened, a crowd gathered in the northwest corner of the campus near the intersection of Linwood and Indiana. This crowd was composed mostly of students, but there were also a few school dropouts. Part of the crowd moved to Central Junior High School and entered the building, running through the halls shouting "School is out." No substantial damage occurred as the crowd left this building.

The principal of the school then called the Police Department and stated that 200 outsiders had entered the building and severe damage was about to occur. Police Chief Clarence Kelley, having been kept advised of the events of the previous evening and the numerous rumors of the morning, learned of this telephone call. Soon thereafter at 8:46 a.m., he ordered a Phase II mobilization of the police force. Notification of the police alert and the student activity was given the Mayor, the Highway Patrol, the Board of Education, and other City officials. Minutes later radio stations broadcast this information to the general public.

One teacher at Central Senior High School saw two groups leaving Central Junior High. One proceeded to the area of 33rd Street between Bales and Askew, where several small cars were overturned by the group and some windows were broken in the heavier automobiles. All of the overturned cars were almost immediately turned right side up. Some in the group entered the rear of a potato chip truck and removed numerous bags of potato chips. The second group leaving Central Junior High proceeded straight for the Central Senior. Two Negro policemen on duty in the vicinity were asked by the principal of Central Junior to help get some of the students back into the schoolrooms.

Inside Central Junior tension eased, and at 9:15 a.m. the memorial service for Dr. King began on schedule in the auditorium. However, 10 to 15 minutes later some non-students entered the building, and the tension was raised again.

Meanwhile, inside Central Senior the principal learned of the march approaching the school from Lincoln and Manual, and school administrators at the Board of Education were contacted. After a lengthy telephone discussion concerning the damage to date, the impending arrival of the march from other high schools, and the presence of outsiders in Central Senior also, the decision was made to dismiss school.

At about the time that marchers from Manual and Lincoln arrived, some damage occurred in the vicinity of 34th and 35th Streets, along Indiana. Several windows were broken, and a brief attempt was made to loot a liquor store at 35th and Indiana. The marching students proceeded south on

Indiana but at 34th Street, turned west one block toward Benton Blvd., where a line of policemen encouraged them to return to Central High School. At this point several policemen used mace to control the crowd.

The group returned to the campus of Central High School, and considerable discussion occurred as to what to do then. A minister urged them to have a short prayer and ceremony for Dr. King there on the campus. One non-student urged that a committee should be selected to draw up a list of demands which the group could consider at a similar meeting on the following day. However, most of the marchers felt that an apology was needed from the police for the use of mace. The ranking officer at the scene, a Police Major, indicated to the Negro civil rights leaders that while he would not apologize for the use of the mace, he would attempt to explain to the crowd that the police felt it was necessary to use the mace in order to prevent further damage. As the Police Major attempted to use the loud speaker system, he encountered microphone difficulty and when the speech was not well received, there was rock throwing directed at the police and their equipment.

The crowd had now been on the campus for about 45 minutes, milling about, obviously leaderless. Some marchers indicated that the problem could only be solved at City Hall, not at Central High School. "If the police won't apologize for the use of mace, let's ask the Mayor to apologize." Among Negro civil rights leaders the decision to march was approved primarily because it would help expend some of the pent-up emotion and energy of the crowd.

At Linwood and Indiana, on the north side of the intersection, a large number of police assembled, but on the south side of the intersection on the edge of the campus of Central High School, the marchers hurled taunts and jeers across the street and threw some rocks at the police. The marchers then left the campus of Central High School and proceeded westward on Linwood Boulevard.

While these events were occurring, other authorities were being alerted. The Highway Patrol was put on full alert and the National Guard Commander in Kansas City contacted

the State Headquarters, advising that trouble was brewing. The Governor called Mayor Davis regarding the possible use of National Guard, and it was agreed that 1,000 National Guard personnel would be put on active duty for deployment in Kansas City.

At about 10:00 a.m., it was publicly announced that the schools in Kansas City, Missouri, were to close. Throughout the entire community rumors began spreading. At the Board of Education and the Police Department, telephone calls from parents showed great anxiety, as rumors of damage and injury spread. Many white persons outside the riot area contacted Negro friends, offering shelter until the trouble was over.

The march from Central High School proceeded westward on Linwood to Woodland, then north one block, then westward again on 31st Street. En route, some minor damage occurred as several cartons of milk were taken off a milk truck, and a few windows were broken in the vicinity of 31st and Woodland. The leadership of the marchers shifted somewhat from time to time, but several Negro civil rights leaders, two non-students and a few ministers appeared to be the most influential. As the march approached 31st and Paseo, efforts were made to turn the march north on Paseo. A majority of the marchers did turn, but a portion of the group continued westward on 31st Street.

Before the group reached 31st and Troost, one non-student who had been observed by the police, was pulled out of the crowd and arrested. A police line had been set up to prevent the marchers from getting into the business area of 31st and Troost, and as the marchers approached, tear gas was used to prevent the marchers from entering the area. The group scattered and rejoined the main body of the march at Troost Lake Park.

At Troost Lake Park, Negro civil rights leaders and other individuals got the marchers to sit down and plan the rest of the march, as the police stood by. Some observers still felt the group was festive, while others felt that they then appeared provoked, but still wanted a peaceful march. Discussion at Troost Lake Park indicated that the students

wanted the Mayor to know what the police had done, so word was passed to the Police Department to let the Mayor know that the marchers wanted to see him at Parade Park. The group then left Troost Lake and continued down Vine Street in a reasonably orderly fashion. A non-student in a car who pulled a gun on a Negro civil rights leader was arrested near 19th and Vine. The group then reached a police line at 19th and Vine where they were detained briefly until the police learned that the Mayor would meet with the marchers at Parade Park. They were then permitted to pass through the police line.

The march moved west on 18th Street toward Paseo, and no substantial damage occurred in the business area of that district. A KPRS radio station disc jockey joined the group at about this time, and mentioned the possibility of a dance to the marchers. The idea of a dance at that time was negated by the desire of the marchers to see the Mayor.

At Parade Park some older non-students began to appear and the leadership of the group changed. It ceased to be a student march. The crowd size en route had varied considerably, generally increasing in size until the group reached Parade Park. As they awaited the Mayor, order was reasonably maintained, but the crowd was restless.

The Mayor arrived and spoke from a police car sound system on the lawn of Gregg Community Center. The sound system was not operative, and Mayor Davis' comments were not well received. Some in the crowd got the feeling that the Mayor was trying to confine the group to the ghetto, and over a bull horn several non-students urged the marchers to go to City Hall. After several moments of confusion, the march headed by the Mayor started toward Truman Road and Paseo on the way to City Hall. They encountered a police line at Truman and Paseo, and the police had specific instructions not to allow the group to pass northward. The Mayor and the crowd were detained briefly by this line while clearance was arranged, but the impression was left with some in the crowd that even the Mayor could not get through the police line. However, when Chief Kelley was contacted downtown,

he immediately instructed his men to permit the Mayor and the marchers to proceed through the line.

A tense moment occurred at this point with lots of pushing by the crowd. When the Mayor proceeded through the line and tried to lead the group north on Paseo, many of them scurried up the embankment of Interstate 70, and at this point the crowd went out of control. The Mayor then got into a police car and proceeded to City Hall ahead of the crowd, many of whom at that time were still on Interstate 70. There was some rock throwing at cars proceeding in the opposite direction on the highway. The crowd left Interstate 70 at 13th and Charlotte, and proceeded toward City Hall. One Negro minister anticipated that adequate transportation might be the key to a peaceful conclusion to the City Hall gathering, so he called the Metropolitan Inter-Church Agency office and asked them to set up buses to transport the crowd away from City Hall following events there.

A few small groups of older non-students were seen in the downtown area before the main body of marchers got to City Hall. As the main body of marchers stopped at City Hall, some of them broke off and went across 12th Street westward toward the downtown area. In a rapid, highly confused series of events, windows were broken and some looting occurred along 12th Street, at 12th and Grand, 12th and Walnut and at 12th and Main. Two elderly women were injured as the crowd swept them off their feet. Police reacted promptly, and attempted to get these groups back to City Hall where the main body of marchers listened to the Mayor and other speakers on the steps of City Hall.

While the tenor of talks at City Hall varied, the majority of the speakers were pleading for order and seeking to calm the crowd. The sound system was extremely poor and this added to the restlessness of the crowd. There were agitators in the crowd seeking to incite them. No high school students spoke during these tense moments. The Police Department and the Highway Patrol were making a show of power and force by setting up a line across 12th Street to prevent people from going into the downtown area. A line of officers was also established in front of the doors of City Hall, and riot

control equipment was plainly in evidence. The Mayor requested that the canine corps, which was also available, be kept out of sight inside City Hall itself.

At about this point, some observers felt that the tension eased a bit as many students seemed to feel they had accomplished what they wanted. They had gotten to City Hall and talked with the Mayor. Other observers felt that the students were becoming bored and were ready to leave. However, the baiters in the crowd tried to goad the police and the crowd into some sort of action. Baiters walked the lines of policemen and shouted abuse. Several cherry bombs and one aerial bomb were thrown several minutes before tear gas was used, and this seemed to have a tensing effect on some of the crowd and the police.

At about this same time, several Negro leaders and the Mayor proceeded from the steps of City Hall to the Police Department to secure the release of the non-student marcher arrested by the police earlier on 31st Street. While this was being done inside the Police Department, the students were being urged over the public address system to go to a dance at Holy Name Church. This announcement was made about 5 to 10 minutes before tear gas was used. Many in the crowd, including policemen as well as observers, viewing the scene from the windows of the Court House building across the street, heard the announcement. Many did not hear it. KPRS officials radioed their station and had them call Holy Name Church to set up the arrangements for the dance.

Shortly after the announcement, many in the crowd started toward buses, three of which were located in the vicinity of 13th and Locust Street. A substantial number of people had already reached and boarded the buses when action accelerated at 12th and Oak. There, one or two persons crawled onto the trunk lid of a sheriff's car which was parked on 12th Street between the crowd and the line of policemen and highway patrolmen protecting the downtown area. A State Highway patrol officer in the line moved forward and struck one of the persons involved before he was pulled back into the line by officers on each side of him. Then the Highway Patrol officers, who formed the southerly part of the line, began

moving forward to protect the car from further vandalism. As the line moved forward, one or two bottles were thrown from the crowd toward the north end of the police line. One of these went over the head of a clergyman and shattered near the feet of a policeman in the line. On the northerly end of this line of officers, a policeman struck one person leaning against a lamp post on the northeast corner of the intersection.

Then the tear gas was thrown. The first gas cannister landed on the grass of the City Hall lawn near the northeast corner of the intersection. This gas was immediately followed by 5 or 6 gas cannisters thrown by the police, primarily from the southerly part of the police line, which at that time was close to the southeast corner of the intersection. The Commission has thoroughly investigated this incident and cannot determine whether the first gas which landed on the lawn was thrown by the police or someone in the crowd. Some tear gas was reported stolen from the police earlier at City Hall. Policemen in the southerly part of the line, where tear gas was admittedly thrown by the police and highway patrol, were not aware of the first cannister which had landed on the grass.

Immediately after gas was used, the crowd remaining on 12th Street between the Court House steps and the City Hall steps scattered to the east, and the line of policemen moved forward. As it moved forward, the line encountered a Negro priest who remained in the area. One patrolman, not recognizing the man as a priest and thinking that he was reaching for the club of an officer next to that patrolman, hit the priest in the side with the end of his club. The priest fell and when a second priest came to his aid, a second patrolman pushed that priest off his feet also. By that time both priests were engulfed by tear gas fumes, and the second priest in particular was partially overcome. He staggered to the grassy area of the Court House lawn, fell, and was picked up and removed from the scene by several young Negroes. Both priests were treated later for minor injuries. Numerous Negro civil rights leaders, on the steps of City Hall, retreated from the gas into the first floor of City Hall, and congregated in the Public Information Office. There a group of 12 or more leaders discussed the

events of the morning, and drew up a list of three demands for the Mayor and the Chief of Police. These demands included:

- a. Tear gas would be used only as a last resort.
- b. The Chief of Police and the Mayor would meet with a select group of Negro leaders.
- c. An apology would be made for the use of tear gas at City Hall.

The group then presented this list to both Mayor Davis and Chief Kelley as they prepared to go to WDAF-TV to make a televised statement to the community.

At about the time the gas was thrown at City Hall, a bus loaded with students, a priest, and a disc jockey, started north on Locust Street on the way to Holy Name Church. As the bus turned the corner on 12th Street and proceeded east, it went through a cloud of gas, and the driver could only continue for about one block further. The bus was abandoned at an angle to the curb and the bus driver's lunch bucket containing money was kicked out the door of the bus. The money in the bucket spilled out, and was taken by the students.

At about this same time, a police lieutenant in plain clothes was walking outside the Federal Building. Without warning, a Negro male walked up and knocked the Lieutenant out. Two other Negro males searched him, found that he was a police officer, took his gun, but left all other valuables, including a watch and wallet.

Following the dispersal of the crowd by the gas at City Hall, there were several instances of property damage eastward along 12th Street.

Meanwhile, at Holy Name Church a crowd, estimated at about 250 people, had arrived from City Hall and started to dance in the basement. Refreshments had been supplied. There were also groups of people milling around outside the church, as the dance continued uninterrupted for approximately 30 minutes.

Outside the church, a white man driving past stopped his car to let a group of students cross the street in front of him. A gang rushed his car, pulling him partially out and commenced beating him. After he was hit several times, someone

said, "Let this whitey go," and the man was able to pull himself back into the car and drive away.

After the white man had driven away, the police came to investigate the incident. As they arrived, rocks were thrown at the cars by persons outside the church. Requests for help were made, and more police responded quickly, because they were already in the general area investigating incidents of disorder following the events at City Hall.

The police used tear gas to break up the crowds outside the church along 23rd Street and Benton Boulevard. Some of these people in the crowds ran down into the church through the west door of the basement. Police then threw tear gas down the west stairwell outside the church. People tried to get out the east door and police threw tear gas down that stairwell. Tear gas was then in the basement in large quantities. On the south side of the church, two windows were broken, and two policemen threw tear gas into those windows of the church basement. There was conflicting testimony as to how these windows were broken, with some speculation not supported by the evidence, that they were broken by gunfire from inside.

In the basement itself pandemonium reigned. Some people attempted to escape through the tear gas at the west entrance. The priest led a major portion of the dancers out of the basement through an inside north exit. A total of 8 spent cannisters of tear gas were found inside the church, on window ledges around the church, and in the stairwells. The mood of the students changed at this point to one of anger and great resentment. Even the popular disc jockey, who conducts these dances, was accused by students of having set this up and trapped them so that they could be gassed in an enclosure. Outside, rock throwing started again and the group was dispersed by additional policemen who arrived on the scene and used additional tear gas.

A middle-aged Negro male attempted to further arouse the people with a story about the police allegedly killing his brother. A police lieutenant checked this out, and after establishing that there was no truth to the rumor, returned to the scene some 25 minutes later. He and a sergeant circulated

through the crowd informing them that there had been no such killing.

At about the same time that the incident was occurring at Holy Name Church, Mayor Davis and Chief Kelley were appearing on television to relate the events of the day to the community as a whole. The group of Negro civil rights leaders who had been a part of most of the morning's activity listened attentively. Mayor Davis was apologetic about the use of tear gas at City Hall, and promised that an investigation would be conducted. Chief Kelley said that he could not comment until there had been a review of what happened. It was while viewing this televised event that a tear gas cannister from Holy Name Church was brought into the meeting, and most of the civil rights leaders then felt there might be serious trouble.

Throughout the afternoon, there were numerous incidents of stoning and reports of some beatings. The majority of dancers from Holy Name Church and others in the Negro community were very angry, and headed for the Central High School area. Inside a drive-in, a window was broken, as was the window of a drug store. Groups gathered along Indiana between 31st and Linwood to discuss events of the day, particularly the Holy Name incident. Emotions were aroused and anger intensified.

In mid-afternoon, Superintendent of Schools James Hazlett returned to the City from his Washington meeting and met with Mayor Davis concerning the possibility of closing schools on Wednesday. Based on that discussion, the announcement was made that schools would be open. Later in the afternoon, the Mayor announced an 8:00 p.m. curfew.

On Tuesday evening, WDAF-TV had a lengthy program involving mostly militant Negro youths. These youths conveyed their resentment over the events of the day. On the streets of the inner-city a signal system was then established by certain elements of the Negro community. Car lights were to remain on, black cloth would be put on the antennas of cars, horns would be honked, and the raised clenched fist would indicate black power.

Trouble occurred between 29th and 30th Street on Pros-

pect and it was a prelude for future events. The managers stayed inside the United Super Store, but a liquor store on the east side of the street was burned down. At about this time, the first death of the Kansas City disorder occurred at 19th and Vine Streets in connection with the looting of a liquor store. Profiles of the six people killed are shown in the Appendix to this report.

Throughout Tuesday night there was extensive looting and burning in the inner-city district. As the night ended, Kansas City could count 94 fires, of which at least 40 were confirmed arson. There was other substantial property damage. Nine people were wounded by the police; one was killed. Three others were shot and wounded by unknown persons; eight other persons were injured.

c. April 10, 1968

Wednesday, April 10th at 5:00 a.m., many telephone calls were made to Negro civil rights leaders for a 6:30 a.m. meeting at Central Christian Church. At this meeting discussion centered on avoiding trouble at the various schools. Two to three people in the meeting were assigned to go to each school. As this meeting was breaking up, the students at Lincoln High School began gathering on the front lawn of the school. This was a common occurrence, as they are not permitted inside the school until the first bell at 8:20 a.m. While a crowd of students on the lawn at this hour was normal, there was underlying anger, resentment and tension left over from the previous day.

A patrolman with a regular beat further south along Woodland Avenue was told to check the situation at Lincoln High School and watch for large gatherings. This was in accordance with common practice, having been started sometime before at the request of school authorities. This patrolman, with his three National Guard companions, made repeated trips past Lincoln High School shortly before and after 8:00 a.m.

Students on the school grounds soon reacted to this. Obscenities were shouted by the students each time the

police car passed the school, and on the last trip, gravel-type rocks were thrown at the car. The patrolman stopped a short distance from the school and called for assistance. Several police cars responded and upon their arrival several policemen moved the large crowd of students by throwing tear gas onto the front lawn of Lincoln. The incident was viewed by various teachers inside the building, who then ran outside to try and prevent further trouble. The students scrambled, trying to get into the school building. Several were momentarily taken into custody by the police, but later released into the school. One non-student who was driving by the school was also taken into custody.

By this time at least six teachers were on the front lawn of the school, standing primarily on the top wall at the front edge of the campus. The police, without an officer of rank present, were on the sidewalk beneath that wall and an angry discussion took place. The teachers urged the police to pull back, and at first this was not done. Then the teachers ordered the police off the campus, and the police called on their radio for an officer of rank to come to the school. A lieutenant responded, saying he was on the way. A few minutes later the lieutenant arrived and saw the confrontation between the teachers and the police. He also noticed that there were some students gathered back on the front lawn of the school, as well as a group of older non-students gathered on the west side of Woodland Avenue. The students on the front lawn of the school were taunting and jeering the police, and an occasional rock was thrown from the crowd.

The lieutenant moved forward toward the faculty members at the top of the wall, but before he got there a rock, coming from the crowd of students on the lawn, hit and injured a patrolman. The police reacted immediately and tear gas was again thrown. At least three cannisters fell on the front lawn of the school. Police then circled the south side of the building, and one cannister of tear gas was thrown into the girls' rest room through an open window at the rear of the building. The tear gas thrown on the front lawn drifted into the building, and students in the school were not able to remain, so the principal ordered all students onto the open football field.

Police surrounded the football field. The lieutenant was requested to withdraw the police from the area, and he did so. After the police were removed, reasonable order was restored by the faculty and Negro civil rights leaders who were there.

Several girls inside the rest room into which tear gas was thrown were incapacitated and were taken to General Hospital.

Although the police had pulled back approximately two blocks, they continued to patrol the area up and down Woodland Avenue. Students were asked by the teachers to leave the school grounds and go home. Some did in small groups. Others, seeing the police in the vicinity, indicated they were afraid to go home.

Several white teachers were present at Lincoln High School that morning. One of them was slugged by a Negro student. His nose was broken. Other white teachers were not harmed.

That same morning a molotov cocktail was thrown near the school library at Central High School, but no major damage occurred.

A meeting of students and other Negro youths was held at Troost Lake Park early in the afternoon. A substantial number of police were in evidence nearby, but some of them left. It was a very angry meeting. Although high school students were in the majority, a large number of older youths were also present. Several Negro youths with switchblade knives made threatening gestures to a white priest who was present, and he, too, withdrew from the scene.

Later on Wednesday, a meeting was held at Municipal Stadium. The police were asked to stay away from this meeting, although a few Negro officers did keep watch on the area. The size of the group diminished as the day passed. Out of this meeting came several items for discussion including police-black community relations, jobs, and school matters. A group of young people was selected to meet with City officials.

At 2:50 p.m. the news media published Mayor Davis' statement that there would be no curfew on Wednesday evening.

In the middle of the afternoon, a group of young Negroes in their mid-20's met to discuss events. They were very militant. Human rights, the struggle for dignity, and greater job

opportunities were discussed, as were violence and willingness to die. As to violence, they felt that they could handle the police, but were not willing to take on the National Guard. Thus, the decision was made to "cool it" until Friday, and see what happened.

Also, on Wednesday, there was another meeting at 8:00 p.m. at the Heart of America Restaurant, where 35 young Negroes met for dinner with a group of older, established Negro leaders. It, too, was an angry meeting, with the youngsters blaming their elders for much of their frustrations. A list of complaints was drawn up at this meeting.

During this meeting, fire was seen near the corner of 31st and Indiana, and the meeting broke up as individuals who owned property or had an interest in that area hurriedly departed to determine what was happening.

On Prospect Avenue, between 29th and 30th, tension had been evident even early in the afternoon. People filled the streets and near the chain store super market located in that block, word was passed that "Tonight we eat free." The operator of a pool hall and the owner of the Byron Hotel, both located across the street from the super market, boarded up the glass windows that directly faced Prospect.

At about 7:00 p.m., several caravans of cars raced up and down the streets, and there were crowds of people in the streets. The manager of the Byron Hotel proceeded to the front of his hotel with his large dog on a leash, and warned people not to come into the hotel. As the rock throwing progressed, the police attempted to break up the crowd in front of the super market by throwing some tear gas. The crowd did disperse, but quickly regathered, jeering and taunting the police as they did so.

Two National Guardsmen, riding with two patrolmen, arrived at the corner of 30th and Prospect, parked their car and walked toward the parking lot of the super market to disperse the crowd. The crowd ran down the alley behind the super market and all four men turned and walked back toward 30th and Prospect. As the crowd regathered behind them, one National Guardsman turned toward them. A shot was fired and he was wounded in the arm. He thought the shot came

from the Byron Hotel. Immediately, heavy firing commenced as the crowd scattered. (Considerable effort has been made by the Commission to reconstruct events at the Byron Hotel. Regarding the origin of the first shot that wounded the Guardsman, one patrolman felt that the shot either came from the Byron Hotel, or from an area north of that hotel. Others felt it may have come from behind the super market. But the Commission has not been able to establish where it came from.) Since the wounded man felt that the shot came from the Byron Hotel, the officers near him focused their return fire on that hotel.

As the gunfire began, Charles "Shugg" Martin was asleep on top of a ledge and propped against the bumper of a car in the used car lot north of the Byron Hotel. Martin was awakened, started to walk forward in a southerly direction, stumbled, and as he regained his balance, was shot. The policeman who shot him had not noticed Martin before, but said he saw Martin reach inside his pocket as he was getting up, and the patrolman thought he was reaching for a weapon.

At about this same time, George McKinney and his son, George, Jr., were killed in front of the Byron Hotel. Neither the police investigation nor this Commission has been able to determine the identity of the persons who fired the fatal shots. The McKinneys were said to have left their home earlier to purchase a bottle of milk at a store. They had apparently joined a group of people watching the fire in the paneling used to board up the windows of the super market.

The wounded National Guardsman was removed from the scene as flashes of gunfire, presumably from snipers, were seen from several locations. Flashes were seen from the top of the Cook Paint Store at 30th and Prospect; from the apartment house porches northwest of the super market in the middle of the block; from behind the Byron Hotel; from the center window in the front of the Byron Hotel; and from the parking lot to the north of the hotel.

Gunfire at various levels of intensity continued for a considerable period of time. The Commission is unable to determine how much gunfire came from snipers, and how much came from the police and National Guard. The police did

shoot out street lights, and neon signs, and shouted at people to put out auto lights and lights inside their homes.

People tried to leave the Byron because of tear gas. The manager and his dog attempted to go out the back door, but encountered a policeman in the back yard who asked that all the occupants come out with their hands up. About a dozen people retreated to the back yard where they were told to spreadeagle on the ground.

In seeking to gain a better view of the Byron Hotel, one patrolman first went through the pool hall north of it. He then circled the north half of the block and came up between the buildings. There he saw several people apparently crouched behind cars in the rear of the hotel, and a group of at least a dozen people on the ground. He moved this entire crowd into a small area between apartments on the south side of 29th Street, and told them to stay there for their own protection.

Additional gas was thrown into the hotel as patrolmen made their way to the front entrance. Cease fire was ordered by police in the street, as the patrolmen went into the hotel. Three people were still in the building and were removed by the police. Several guns were confiscated in the hotel, but most of them came from the owner's room where he kept his gun collection. Laboratory tests on the guns were inconclusive as to whether they had been fired recently.

At about this same time, around the corner at 2610 East 30th Street, Julius Hamilton stepped toward the front porch in the apartment where he was visiting. At that time a member of the police anti-sniper team was located beside the apartment house, and signaled to patrolmen in the street that he was coming out. Patrolmen in the street called to the policeman: "Come out, we have you covered." Hamilton apparently heard this and began opening the screen door. At that time a shot was heard and the anti-sniper policeman fell to the ground. One patrolman on the street thought the policeman had been shot and saw the shadow of Julius Hamilton. He fired, and Hamilton became Kansas City's fifth fatality of the riots.

As the event near the Byron Hotel became known to City officials, Mayor Davis quickly imposed a 9:00 p.m. curfew.

At about this time, a fire captain was wounded by a sniper 4 blocks south of the Byron Hotel. Shortly thereafter, a second National Guardsman was shot and wounded by a sniper approximately one block from where the fire captain was wounded.

A short time later, Kansas City's sixth and final death occurred. Albert Miller was driving his car, with other occupants, when they passed a police barricade at 31st near Park. He was traveling at a high rate of speed with his lights out and reportedly had a flat tire. A shot was reportedly fired from the Miller car at a police car. The police returned fire and Miller was killed.

Throughout the evening burning and looting continued. The total statistics for the evening of Wednesday, April 10th, included five deaths, eight civilians wounded and three civilians otherwise injured. One patrolman was injured and two National Guardsmen and one fireman were wounded. A total of 45 arson fires occurred on this evening. The damage from these fires was much greater than that on Tuesday night.

d. After April 10, 1968

For all practical purposes, the coming of dawn Thursday, April 11th, brought an end to the civil disorder in Kansas City. Some arrests were made during the day on Thursday, and about noon a Negro looter was wounded. However, such activity diminished considerably. Arson fires dropped from 45 on Wednesday evening to 2 on Thursday evening.

On Friday, April 12th, a meeting was held with the Mayor, Chief of Police and several young Negroes for the purpose of discussing grievances. The results of the meeting were inconclusive, but the meeting did give the young, angry Negroes a forum. The Mayor and the Chief were the objects of abusive language, such as "Figurehead" and "Gorilla."

Throughout the days of trouble, there were numerous incidents indicating both good will and bad will. Many in the black community felt that some members of the Police De-

partment took advantage of these days of unrest to vent their feelings against black people. The gist of the Negro complaints is that the police often made no distinction, or attempted to make no distinction, between those Negroes who were creating the problem and those who were helping quell the uprising. A few examples of the type of complaints that have been made are: the alleged beating and kicking of a pregnant woman; the alleged use of tear gas against young children; the alleged beating of a motorist; and the alleged severe verbal abuse of prisoners at the police station. Such complaints are investigated by the Police Department. Some are unfounded, but there have been at least three instances of disciplinary action taken against policemen by the Department.

On the other hand, numerous evidences of good will were demonstrated, particularly among white people who expressed great concern for the safety of those Negroes with whom they were acquainted. People of all races promptly helped provide food, clothing and shelter to the victims of the riot.

And so, Kansas City began to add up its loss. In statistics the loss amounted to six people killed, eighteen wounded by police, eighteen wounded or injured by unknown persons, three National Guardsmen and firemen wounded, thirteen National Guardsmen and firemen injured, ten policemen injured, sixteen citizens treated for tear gas, 312 buildings damaged, \$915,000 in property damage, a total of 98 confirmed arson fires between April 8th and April 13th, and 1,042 persons arrested. 278 were arrested for felonies, and of those, 193 had prior criminal records.

COMMENTARY ON THE FACTS

The Commission finds no evidence of conspiracy or unusual outside influence in the civil disorder experienced in Kansas City in April.

The basic cause and apparent necessary ingredient of riots which have occurred in our country is a long history of social and economic tensions and frustrations, which have established an emotional state among Negro ghetto residents that can be triggered into mass disorder and violence by the occurrence of an otherwise comparatively unimportant incident.

The most frequent reasons ascribed for the creation of this volatile emotional state of tension and frustration are: inequities in the educational system for ghetto dwellers; the lack of adequate job opportunities; long standing difficulties with the Police Department; problems in housing; and finally, the frustration in efforts to relieve these conditions. The situation in Kansas City, which created a readiness for violence, did not differ materially from that in other cities about the country, although the usual factors were not considered to be "as bad" here as elsewhere. Their presence, however, does seem to have been more apparent to newcomers to Kansas City than to long-term residents, including business leaders, school officials and a majority of older Negro leaders.

Just how many of these factors is necessary to establish a state of readiness to riot is not known. Studies to date have not shed very much light on what actually motivates persons to riot. Regrettably, this Commission's report does not shed any further real light in this area.

From what has been observed in most cities, these civil disturbances usually proceed through four stages.

(1) A precipitating or triggering event.—This is always something that is seen by the black community in the ghetto as evidence of injustice, or as insulting, and therefore inflammatory. More often than not, this event involves the Police Department, because the police most often come in contact with those persons likely to riot, and the police are the symbol

of the authority which creates their tensions and frustrations. This triggering event may be a routine arrest, police brutality, or any other occurrence which is viewed as humiliating or unjust. It is frequently relatively minor or even trivial in relation to the violence that follows.

(2) An apparent over-reaction by some of the people which results in a confrontation, usually with the Police Department, and which often results in a police response; for example, attempting to clear the streets. During this response, people often get physically moved or pushed, and thus get even angrier.

(3) The people retaliate by hurling rocks, bottles and other debris at the police, as well as by verbal harassment. This has most often been done by young people ranging from twelve years in age upwards. The situation at this point frequently resembles a "Roman Holiday"—crowds in the streets are joined by the curious, bystanders, and many otherwise uninvolved individuals. Attempts are then made by the Police Department to continue clearing the street, and anyone in the vicinity is likely to be swept up in this mass effort with the possibility of being arrested, injured or insulted.

(4) If the above process continues, the fourth and final stage is entered in which the youths are replaced by older youths and adults (principally by adults) and burning, looting, and sometimes sniping occurs.

The Kansas City riot differed, in that the conventional first phase in its usual form, never actually occurred. The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4 did accentuate the tension, and aroused the emotions of Negroes throughout our country, including Kansas City. This emotional state was further aggravated, and a student march was precipitated by the failure of the Kansas City schools to close on April 9, the day of his funeral. The feeling among most of the Negro high school students was that Kansas City, Missouri, was not demonstrating the proper respect for Dr. King, and this was evidenced to them by the fact that Kansas City, Kansas, schools did close. Thus, the demonstration march was started with many students in an excitable state of mind. It was inevitable that shortly thereafter there would be a confronta-

tion with the police, since school authorities, including both the Board of Education and individual principals had historically turned to the Police Department for help in disciplinary matters. This practice of repeatedly requesting police assistance was of such extent that control of the school grounds was virtually turned over to the Police Department by school authorities. After the confrontation, whether justified or not, there were many incidents that followed which persons in the march, in their state of high emotional excitement, considered to be unjust, insulting and inflammatory. Subsequent to the first confrontation, the Commission feels that the movement towards a full scale upheaval followed the usual course.

The following represents the impressions of the Commission with regard to the major events just prior to and during the course of the disturbance itself:

1. Failure of Kansas City Public Schools to close on Tuesday, April 9.

This is seen as a primary cause of the disturbances, because the failure to close schools in Kansas City, Missouri, on Tuesday angered a large number of Negro students. The question of whether to hold school on Tuesday, April 9th, was first discussed on Saturday, April 6th, between the Superintendent of Schools and a staff member. The decision was made to hold school, and there was no indication at that time that Kansas City, Kansas, would not do likewise.

On Sunday, April 7th, the Superintendent left the City on business, and did not delegate his authority as Superintendent to any one of his staff members.

On Monday, April 8th, the decision to hold school was extensively discussed among school officials, some school board members and Negro civil rights leaders, but there is no evidence that any school principals were consulted. Although there was some difference of opinion even among Negro civil rights leaders, it was the consensus that it would be better to hold school than to dismiss at a time when all businesses were not closing, and to dismiss school might result in children

being at home when other family members were not present. These discussions took place without any consultation with Kansas City, Kansas, school officials. Late that afternoon and evening, when it was learned that the Kansas City, Kansas, schools would be closed and school officials received information that the Kansas City, Missouri, school children were themselves planning to leave school, there was no change in the original decision to hold school, made two days previously.

The Commission cannot criticize the Saturday decision, but feels that the additional information received on Monday justified serious reconsideration of that decision. Discussion should have included school principals who would best know the mood of the students themselves, as well as the Police Department, which would have the problem of coping with any demonstration by students.

The expressed views of witnesses with regard to the children's departure from school on April 9 varied substantially. Some said "the kids just wanted a holiday"; others, that the students were angered because Kansas City, Kansas, schools were closed and the Missouri schools were not. Others said that the students wanted to mourn the death of Martin Luther King in a more appropriate way than the ceremonies planned at school. Still others said that there had been long-standing difficulties with the educational system, and this offered an opportunity to the students to show their feelings. It is apparent that black communities all over the country saw in Martin Luther King the first nationally accepted black hero, and if the flag could be lowered to half-mast for him, certainly they felt the schools should be closed. To those observers who felt that there was very little mourning on the part of the marching students, but that more of a holiday mood was present, it should be remembered that Negro grief is quite often an emotional rather than a somber matter.

The Commission, in retrospect, feels that it is quite possible that closing of the schools on the morning of April 9 might well have prevented the events that followed during the next two days. As it was, it gave the students the opportunity to assemble en masse at school, which would have been quite difficult had school not been open. On the other hand, the

state of readiness to riot had to already exist, and if it had not been triggered by the failure to close the schools and by the events of the march, it may well have been triggered by other events at some later period during the summer months.

2. Riot Preparation—Kansas City Police Department.

Police Departments in general have been thrown into somewhat of a quandary as to how to deal with riots. To be too lenient would probably be permissive of looting and destruction. On the other hand, to use too much force might well result in a more rapid escalation of riot activities. The net result of either of these might thus be the same. The proper role is a difficult one, and rests at some point in between the two extremes. Proper preparation for a riot obviously consists of more than just planning for the upheaval itself. Because the policeman is perceived by the ghetto resident as the principal representative of the oppressive forces, proper preparation to prevent disturbances should include getting to know, and becoming helpfully involved with the ghetto community.

The Kansas City Police had made their preparations to cope with a civil disturbance over a period of many months. This preparation included the study of riots in other cities, instruction in riot control, supplying itself with adequate riot control equipment, and the development of a joint plan with the State Highway Patrol and the National Guard. The preparation did not include securing the more extreme weapons that had been used in several other cities during riots. It appears that most of the preparation had been geared toward containment and suppression of disturbances which might become a riot, with little preparation for prevention by techniques that have been employed in some other metropolitan areas. Preparation for prevention in other areas has included the use of so-called "white hat groups" (it is quite true that youths who may riot on one day are quite willing to serve as anti-rioters on a subsequent day), ministers, Negro civil rights leaders, athletes, and other Negro leaders. Such persons have been used to "cool" things at a point prior to the outbreak of activities. They can be used effectively for "cooling" a disturbance even through Stage 3, previously described.

In the early part of the student march, the Police Department went into Phase II (total mobilization) of its riot control plan in the obvious belief that the students' demonstration march was the forerunner of an actual riot. Whether this step was necessary or desirable was the subject of much conflicting testimony before the Commission. Any conclusion at this point would have to be highly speculative.

3. The students' march en route from Manual and Lincoln High Schools.

The group which marched from Manual and Lincoln High Schools to Central was described as generally orderly, demonstrated a degree of gaiety, and created no known damage of any consequence. Some property damage did occur in the Central High School area just prior to or at about the time the group of students began arriving from Lincoln and Manual. There were several cars overturned, some car windows smashed, and several other cars were scarred. Some of the first policemen on the scene indicated that the group was very disorderly and out of control. Others, including some policemen, but principally Negro civil rights leaders, found the group not particularly disorderly at first and willing to obey requests of such leaders to desist when they started rock throwing or trying to overturn cars. After the arrival of the mass of students in the Central area, the windows of a nearby liquor store were broken out and attempts made to enter the store. Then there was a massing of cars containing young Negroes which could not effectively be dispersed. The group also included at this time a number of non-students. It is quite evident that no single individual, whether policeman, civil rights leader or others, had a total overview of the entire picture in the Central High School area covering several blocks. In some areas and at some times the group appeared totally uncontrolled. At other sections and at different times the students were not extremely disorderly and responded to their elders.

However, despite a series of confrontations with the police (at Central High School, 31st and Troost, the park area be-

tween Paseo and Troost beginning at 31st Street) the students, with adults accompanying them, made their march toward City Hall with reasonable order prevailing, and with no very substantial property damage being caused. It was apparent, however, that as the march proceeded toward Parade Park, persons other than students became an active part of the group. At Parade Park the march seemed to cease being a student march, when many unknown adults started taking over. Some of these worked as anti-rioters, and some were endeavoring to incite a riot. The Mayor addressed the group, but his efforts were ineffective due in part to the failure of the public address system to function properly.

4. Events at City Hall.

It became quite evident at City Hall and downtown that events were out of the hands of the students. While the bulk of the students and others stopped or were stopped at City Hall, a group estimated at 100 to 200 persons got into the downtown area, and this segment was obviously bent on lawlessness as evidenced by broken windows, some looting, and injuries to at least two elderly women. That segment was quickly, forcefully and properly contained by the police and the State Highway Patrol.

At City Hall there were some who paid attention to the speeches that were going on, while others milled about in a restless and sometimes festive mood. Adults, not students, however, handled the microphone, and there were a number of agitators in the crowd.

The announcement of a dance at Holy Name Catholic Church was, in the Commission's judgment, perhaps the most significant anti-riot suggestion of the entire morning. This had not been planned or discussed in advance with the Police Department. The announcement, however, was heard by a number of police officers in the City Hall area, and by a number of City and County officials, some of whom were observing events from the windows of the County Court House across the street. In addition, although not recalled by Chief Kelley, one civil rights leader said he informed the Chief at the police

station during the disturbance at City Hall that they were trying to get the students to a dance at Holy Name Church. The fact that attempts were being made to get the crowd to go to a church to dance also appears in the police log, but its importance apparently was overlooked by the dispatcher. It would thus appear that the failure of the policemen on duty in the vicinity of Holy Name Church to be aware of a dance in the basement of the church was due to a breakdown in communications within the Police Department. It also demonstrated the lack of effective liaison between the police and Negro leaders who were attempting to prevent trouble.

The evidence presented to the Commission failed to establish whether the first tear gas at City Hall was thrown by the police, the Highway Patrol, or by someone in the crowd who had stolen tear gas from the police. Regardless of this unresolved issue, it is clear to the Commission that the use of tear gas by the police and Highway Patrol was not in response to, or retaliation for, any tear gas which may have been thrown by a member of the crowd.

With respect to the incident involving two priests which occurred immediately after tear gas was used at City Hall, it may well be that the officers involved had their vision restricted by their gas masks and did not recognize the men as priests. There was no evidence to indicate that either priest was in fact endeavoring to interfere with the police officers in the performance of their duty, but both were present in an effort to preserve peace in the crowd. If some helpful assistance had been given them by the police after the event, perhaps the subsequent feeling about the incident might have been somewhat alleviated.

5. The Holy Name Church incident.

As a result of the previously mentioned breakdown of communications, police on duty near Holy Name Church at 23rd and Benton were not aware of the dance in progress in the basement when they came to the church in answer to a call about a disturbance.

Admittedly, there had been a previous incident where a

man had been dragged from his car and beaten on the street, and there were groups of people on the street who threw rocks at police cars as they arrived. Tear gas was used to disperse the crowd on the streets outside the church, but the Commission finds that tear gas was also thrown into the church basement where the dance was in progress. While a valid judgment may not be possible as to the need for using tear gas outside the church, the Commission finds no justification whatever for the throwing of tear gas into the church basement.

There were a few policemen who reported that they heard shots coming from the south windows of the basement of the church. However, other than these reported sounds and the breaking of glass, there is no evidence that there was any firing of any weapon from within the church at any time. The windows from which the shots were reportedly fired were at a height of more than 9 feet from the floor, and were in a large closet. In addition, tear gas was already in the church when the sounds were heard. The Commission feels that an investigation definitely should have been made by the police on duty before tear gas was thrown into the church.

Some members of the Police Department did acquit themselves notably well after the event by investigating and securing information which dispelled an inflammatory rumor being circulated by an adult agitator to further inflame the crowd. These officers returned to the area after their investigation, mingled with the crowd, and quelled the false and inflammatory rumor. This action may have prevented further disturbance at that time.

6. Police tactics and use of tear gas.

The use of tear gas as a method of subduing or dispersing a large number of persons is quite effective, and in comparison with alternative methods, it is certainly less harmful. It is temporarily irritating and distracting, but does not do permanent damage to its victims according to all information available. (This was confirmed by recent communication to the Commission from the U. S. Food and

Drug Administration.) There were reports of several persons who inhaled tear gas during the disturbances and became sick. It is conceivable that individuals with some chronic respiratory or heart disease could suffer considerable discomfort and harm, but the likelihood of permanent damage is considered remote. In fact, the use of tear gas in such disturbances is recommended in the Report of the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

Although the use of tear gas is much more humane than the use of the baton or the gun, it should be noted that its psychological effect in rendering persons helpless who are responding from an underdog position, is to anger and frustrate them, perhaps even more than would be true by the use of the baton or the gun. Tear gas is also less selective in that it subdues not only the person or persons creating a disturbance, but all other individuals who happen to be in the vicinity including, of course, those who may not be guilty of any wrongdoing.

In dispersing disorderly groups of people by the use of tear gas, the police unfortunately and inevitably are treating anti-rioters who are within the group in the same manner that they are treating the offenders in the group. In short, no distinction between persons can be made when tear gas is used. This is most unfortunate because anti-rioters, who otherwise could possibly have considerable effect in preventing further trouble, cease assisting in the prevention of an escalation of the disturbance. Thus, it must remain a matter of judgment by the policeman on the spot, under all the circumstances, as to which method of subduing or dispersing people best fits the situation at hand.

7. Following the Holy Name Church incident.

Persons with an inclination or desire for mass violence and lawlessness found themselves with a suitable emotional platform to give them support for their unlawful activities. The Commission believes that it was the series of events on the morning and in the early afternoon of April 9, culminating in the gassing of the students attending the dance within the church, that provided the emotional climate for the violence, looting and burning that followed.

8. Lincoln High School incident—Wednesday, April 10.

The fact that the students at Lincoln High School are not allowed by the principal to enter the building until after the first bell rings always results in their milling around the school grounds in front of the school until that time. At the request of school authorities, the police regularly patrol the areas near the inner-city high schools before school begins in the morning and when school is dismissed in the afternoon.

The event of the previous day and night should have been evident to both the police officers who patrol the area and the school authorities that great tension and feeling existed in the Negro community. Apparently it did not occur to either the school principal or the police that this day might make different procedures advisable.

For the police car to patrol the area, passing the building repeatedly with a car full of National Guardsmen, could only be provocative to the students who were required to wait in the school yard. That this was true was evidenced by the shouting of obscenities, and finally the throwing of rocks or gravel before the more serious trouble occurred. Furthermore, in the emotional climate existing, the principal of the school should have required the students to enter the building upon arrival, rather than to forbid them to do so. Thus foresight by either the police or the school principal might have prevented the resulting hostile confrontation.

It appears to the Commission that tear gas thrown onto the school campus and later into the school building should have been avoided. Credit is due to several teachers who helped control the students in the emergency and to the police lieutenant who withdrew the policemen from the scene, and thus permitted the restoration of order. The events at Lincoln High School on Wednesday morning not only inflamed the emotions of the students and faculty, but also the parents of the students who were gassed. Resentment of this incident was felt by the entire Negro community, and the platform and climate for violence, looting and burning was further strengthened, and such conduct became justifiable in the eyes of some in the Negro community.

9. The Byron Hotel incident—Wednesday night, April 10.

Following the wounding of a National Guardsman by an unknown sniper, there was extensive gunfire by police, the National Guard and snipers. Flashes, presumably from the guns of snipers, was said to have been observed in at least five different locations by various policemen. That there was a sniper or snipers in the general vicinity of the Byron Hotel is beyond question. But no sniper was shot, apprehended or identified.

After the wounding of the National Guardsman, George McKinney, George McKinney, Jr., and Charles (Shugg) Martin were shot and killed in the gunfire which followed. None of them was armed. None of them is known to have engaged in any unlawful activity during the riots. They can only be classified as the innocent victims of a tragic occurrence.

The Julius Hamilton incident—Julius Hamilton was shot and killed by a police officer as he was attempting to walk onto the porch of an apartment building in the neighborhood of the Byron Hotel. There was no curfew at the time. Julius Hamilton was not armed. His death was the result of a tragic mistake caused by the tension, confusion, apprehension, and danger that was present in that area throughout the riot. The Commission understands that the family has received the apology of the officer and of the Police Department.

The Commission has made contact with members of the family of all of those killed and expressed our sympathy and regrets. These relatives have indicated that they have never been visited by representatives of either the Police Department or of the City Government, with the exception of the very recent apology in the Hamilton case. This occurred after the family had requested a hearing. The Commission does not have the power of subpoena, nor has it undertaken to conduct detailed investigations of these four deaths in order to determine whether any disciplinary action is warranted. That is the responsibility of the Police Department or other authorities. However, these were tragic deaths, and the failure of the City Government and the Police Department to promptly send a representative to express condolences is indeed regrettable.

10. Treatment of the Negro Community by the police during the riot.

It has been estimated that not over 1% of Kansas City's 100,000 Negro citizens were involved in the looting, burning and violence which occurred during our April riots. The majority of Negro Kansas Citians were just as much or more concerned and fearful as were those in the white community. Many of them lived in the area where the most violence occurred, and they badly needed and expected the protection of their person and property by the law enforcement officers. Many of them felt that because they lived in the area and were Negroes, they were suspect and were so treated. They felt that their areas were controlled and contained for the protection of the balance of the Kansas City community, and that they therefore did not receive the protection to which they were entitled.

In the tension, excitement, and apprehension that existed during the riots, many of these people suffered indignities and verbal and physical abuse at the hands of policemen. This fostered and confirmed their feeling that Negroes were being viewed as a class and not as individuals, and that all were considered possible rioters.

The Commission does not feel that the behavior of those policemen who rendered indignities, insults and abuse to innocent persons was by any means characteristic of the behavior of the entire Police Department. There were notable exceptions and incidents in which the Police Department distinguished itself during those trying times. Unfortunately, however, the mistakes of some offset to a marked degree the fine performance of others in the eyes of the Negro community, resulting in blanket condemnation of the Police Department by some.

COMMENTARY ON THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

It has been observed in most of the cities of our nation where riots have occurred that the abrasive relationship between the police and minority communities has been a major—and explosive—source of grievance, tension and disorder. The police are faced with demands for increased protection and service in the ghetto, yet the practices necessary to meet these demands create tension and hostility. The police have often been described as the symbol of what the ghetto resident resents and frequently hates. This has been true in Kansas City, as evidenced by the fact that the riots were almost immediately followed by criticism of the police generally, and by demands of various Negro groups for the resignation of Chief Clarence Kelley. It seems that Chief Kelley has been blamed by some for every mistake claimed to have been made by anyone in connection with the handling of problems during the riots.

This was Kansas City's first experience in major racial violence, and some mistakes were to be expected. There is no question but that mistakes were made by many individuals as well as by governmental agencies and departments and by public school officials. It is doubtful if anyone involved would, in retrospect, feel that everything he did was "just right."

But this City must not fail to give due credit and appreciation to those policemen, National Guardsmen, Missouri State Highway Patrolmen and others who exposed themselves to great personal danger and worked long, sleepless nights to protect the lives and property of all the people of the City. The commendable policy of the police to never withdraw from a besieged area showed both concern for the safety of the citizens living in the vicinity and the bravery of the officers.

This report contains criticism which the Commission hopes is constructive and does not merely amount to "second guessing" as to the actions and policy of the Police Department, Board of Education, City Officials and others. Personalities and comments respecting specific individuals have been generally avoided, so that the Commission could focus on the

larger objective of pointing out facts, and making recommendations which might aid Kansas City in moving forward constructively toward the attainment of better community relations and services for all of its citizens.

Nonetheless, because of the vital role of the Police Department in community relations and services, and because of the focus of criticism by some on Chief Kelley, the Commission feels that the entire community should have an objective evaluation from us regarding the Chief, and our belief as to his ability and capacity to head our Police Department in these complex and difficult times. The Commission has heard extensive testimony, and carefully considered it and other evidence pertaining to that subject.

Although there were some differing opinions expressed by witnesses before the Commission, the factual evidence and the overwhelming weight of the opinion evidence from those in a position best to know and evaluate the facts, established beyond question that Chief Kelley is a capable and competent Chief of Police. He is honest and fair, has real integrity, and is highly respected generally by the policemen under his command, including the Negro policemen. He is well qualified for his job, is a good administrator, and utilizes modern and advanced techniques and equipment. Under his leadership the department has steadily improved in quality in most respects. He has the capacity to adapt to changing times and demands, and is now demonstrating this. He is receptive to ideas and suggestions for improvement. The Commission has noted that the Police Department already has implemented several innovations discussed during the course of the Commission's investigation.

When Chief Kelley assumed command of the Kansas City Police Department several years ago, he faced a tremendous job of reorganization. Improvement and change was needed badly in many areas of the Department and its work. At the command level, many replacements had to be made in order to insure that directives and information could flow freely in both directions from the office of the Chief to the lowest patrolman. Human relations training and the relations between the Department and segments of the public were not what

they should have been. Although much has been accomplished, there remains much to be done both within the Department and toward improving relations between the Department and the community.

Kansas City is one of only three cities in the United States whose Police Department is not administered under local control. The Board of Police Commissioners is appointed by the Governor, and the major policies, budget estimates and other matters pertaining to the welfare of the Department and the security of the city are determined by the Board of Police Commissioners. The Department is strictly controlled by Missouri statutes that impose limitations on the number of officers, their qualification, promotion and compensation. With the complex problems existing today in urban areas, there would seem to be little reason why Kansas Citians could not better understand their local needs than can State Legislators and officials, and have control over the policing of their own community. If the Board which determines police policy were appointed by the Mayor of Kansas City subject to the approval of the City Council, and regulated by City ordinances, it could be expected to have a greater awareness and sensitivity to local problems, than has been shown under state control. The Commission has noted the Governor's recent expression that he would be willing to surrender to the Mayor of Kansas City the responsibility of appointing the Police Board.

There presently exists a frightening shortage of officers to police our city. Our Department strength does not even approach the number of officers contemplated by the statutes (R. S. Mo., Sec. 84.510), and the Commission feels that present day conditions make even the limitations of that statute out of date.

It is also frightening to contemplate the effects of the currently proposed reductions in police officers, civilian employees and services, which are made necessary by the present lack of funds. This lack of funds is directly traceable to the State Legislature and its inability or refusal to recognize the needs of the Kansas City community. The present shortage of funds requires the Police Department to immediately reduce its force by 50 officers and 15 civilian employees; to eliminate

school patrols; to defer the purchase of equipment; to close two police stations; to close the Police Academy; and to reduce or eliminate other needed services.

Even before the reduction in force, Kansas City has only 932 law enforcement officers, or 1,119 fewer officers than St. Louis. Kansas City policemen must enforce the law and provide services in an area of approximately 316 square miles, compared to only 62 square miles covered by the St. Louis force. Yet, St. Louis police patrol a population of only 100,000 more people than there are in Kansas City. Recommendations of the Commission for improvements in the Police Department and its function must remain in large part meaningless unless adequate financing of these needs can be secured.

Instead of its police force being reduced, this city needs a total of at least 1,500 police officers. Even the existing statute contemplates two police employees for each 800 persons in the population. Since 1961 Kansas City's population has increased by approximately 15%, and its land area has been nearly doubled by annexation. Expected police service has increased by 58%, but the number of law enforcement personnel has remained approximately the same as it was in 1961.

The police are underpaid. A starting patrolman receives a gross salary of \$532 per month or \$6,384 per year. This compares most unfavorably with starting police salaries in other cities, even though police salaries throughout most of the country are generally inadequate.

In today's urban communities we need and expect policemen with broad qualifications and abilities who can promote good human relations, and who will risk their lives daily for the protection of the life and property of others. Yet we compensate them on a basis lower than that of many who perform labor not requiring education, judgment or discretion, and certainly no risk to life.

Kansas City has a shortage of Negro officers despite the fact that a Negro sergeant is in charge of recruiting, and tries to recruit officers both in Kansas City and throughout the surrounding area. This problem exists throughout the country because those Negroes who would be legally qualified as police recruits can generally find other less

dangerous employment elsewhere and at better pay. This situation could be relieved by providing educational opportunities to interested applicants who otherwise do not meet the education requirements. It is suspected that the long standing feeling among Negroes that racial discrimination has existed within the Department also prevents many Negroes from being interested in becoming policemen.

When Chief Kelley became chief of the Kansas City Police Department, there were no Negro civilian employees and few Negro officers holding any rank. Most of the promotions of Negro officers and all of the hiring of Negro civilian employees has occurred in recent years and during the present police administration. In order to prevent any possibility of racial bias interfering with promotions of Negro officers, the Police Department in the last two years has adopted a promotion policy which requires both written and oral examinations. The recommendation of supervisors counts only 10% of the total score. The grades on the examinations are posted, and promotions are made in order from the top of the examination score list. In spite of this, there is still some feeling in the Negro community that discrimination is practiced in police promotions. This seriously hampers recruiting of Negro officers. An increase in the size of the police force would increase the number of promotions in the Department and tend to remove this feeling.

Under the present administration, human relations training has become recognized as an important part of the course at the Police Academy, but the Commission feels that the extent of this training is still inadequate to cope with today's problems. The Department needs to have an ongoing program of human relations training for all officers. The Community Relations Division of the Department needs to be expanded, and must be headed by an imaginative and creative officer well trained in the subject. It is clear that at least part of the problem, contributing to the prevention of the type of progress that should have been made in this area, has been the lack of adequate funds. Even with the

funds presently available, however, more progress in human relations should be made.

It also seems that the Police Department has not adequately publicized its own progress in all areas, including human relations. Although the Department investigates all complaints made by citizens against policemen, it does not usually publicize the action that is taken on such complaints. The public does not know that officers found to be unfit often resign on request. The public does not know that complaints by citizens sometimes result in suspension, dismissal, or reprimand. The public does not know that some complaints are determined to have been groundless and others actually trumped up or fraudulent. Since the public does not know these things, there are some who believe that police officers are protected and go unpunished even when guilty of flagrant misconduct. The public mind must be relieved of such suspicions. The Police Department needs to improve its public relations.

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Commission recommends the following:

1. The necessary steps should be taken to return the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department to local control. It should function under a police board, the members of which are appointed by the Mayor, subject to approval by the City Council.

Study should be made of the possibility of eventually having a Metropolitan Police Department functioning in the entire metropolitan area. It is believed that such a metropolitan department could function more efficiently and economically than can separate police departments in all of the cities comprising the metropolitan area. The possibility of a Metropolitan Police Department in the future should not be permitted to postpone the return of our present department to local control.

2. The size of the Police Department should be substantially increased, hopefully by at least 600 additional policemen.

3. The compensation of police officers should be substantially increased in order to facilitate securing the best qualified persons to handle police needs in today's complex urban community. It has been aptly stated that today's police officer needs the qualities of a psychologist as well as the qualifications previously expected of a policeman. Policemen should be compensated accordingly.

4. The number of Negro officers on the police force should be substantially increased. At the present time there are only 5% to 6% of the officers in the Department who are Negroes. These are considered capable officers, but more are needed for the benefit they could give the Department in the areas of both law enforcement and human relations. In order to secure more Negro officers, more recruits must be trained, and provision should be made for providing educational opportunities for Negroes interested in the Department,

so as to assist them in meeting existing educational requirements for policemen.

5. Police promotions are presently considered by members of the Department, including Negroes, to be based on merit and to be fair and objective. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a permanent board, or one which serves for a definite term, to administer the oral examination in connection with the Department promotions. Such a promotions board should include local experts rather than those whose primary interests are outside of Kansas City. For example, the board could consist of a local F.B.I. agent, a member of the University of Missouri at Kansas City Law School faculty, and a psychologist or psychiatrist practicing in Kansas City.

6. The Department should place greater emphasis on human relations and human relations training, both in the Police Academy and throughout the Police Department. Human relations instruction and training should be an ongoing program with required participation by all officers. Human relations training at the Academy and within the Department should be by teachers who are experts in the field of human relations.

7. In the assignment of policemen to patrol duty, there should be a continuing effort to select those officers who best understand the current problems of the people and culture of the area to which they are assigned.

8. In the inner-city area in particular, foot patrolmen should be used to the extent possible, as it is clear that the foot patrolman gets better acquainted with the people in his area, and has a better understanding of their thoughts and problems than do motorized patrolmen.

9. A Police Cadet program involving underprivileged young people, including Negroes, should be established. Such a program would encourage the interest of youths in a police career, and would also improve understanding between the police and the people of the inner-city.

10. The Department now has two neighborhood offices, or so-called store front operations, which have no law enforcement function, but are designed and used for human

relations purposes in bringing the Department in closer contact with the people within the inner-city. These offices are presently considered to be understaffed due to the existing shortage of policemen. The number of policemen assigned to this duty should be increased, and the number of store front operations should be doubled.

11. The public should be informed as to the proper procedure for making and prosecuting complaints which individual citizens may have against members of the Police Department. All complainants should be allowed to have representation by an attorney at every level of investigation of their complaints, and at all hearings thereon. The Legal Aid and Defenders Society of Greater Kansas City should be requested to supply an attorney to represent complainants who do not have adequate funds to employ their own attorney. The attorney for complainants should be given access to Department investigation reports and should be permitted to subpoena his own witnesses for hearings held by the Board of Police Commissioners.

12. The Police Department should inform the public as to the disposition of complaints made by citizens against police officers. Many members of the public may know of the complaint but never learn of its disposition. Equal publicity should be given to the disposition of complaints regardless of whether or not a complaint is determined to have merit.

13. Communications between the Police Department and Negro leaders, including the younger leaders, should be improved so that the Department will be constantly aware of the needs and problems within the Negro community, and may receive suggestions and recommendations from the Negro community concerning relations with and services to them. Such communication could assume many forms and be accomplished by the various methods which the Department may determine to be most effective.

14. The Community Relations Division of the Police Department should be increased in number of personnel. Its work and program should be expanded, and it should be

staffed with persons particularly well qualified in human relations.

15. The personnel of the Internal Affairs Unit of the Department, which is responsible for investigating complaints, should be increased in number so that the length of time required for investigating complaints would usually be no more than four weeks.

16. Communications should be improved between the Department and police departments of other cities in the area, the Board of Education, City departments, and civil rights groups and organizations, so that there would be a free and accurate flow of information, particularly in time of emergency.

17. The Governor's Advisory Committee on Human Relations, whose function has been to advise the Board of Police Commissioners in that area, has become comparatively inactive and a vacancy has existed in the chairmanship of that committee for well over a year. So long as the Police Department remains under state control, the Governor should appoint a new chairman and the committee should function. When the Police Department is placed under local control, consideration should be given to the appointment of such a committee by the Mayor, unless it is felt by him that the function of the committee could better be filled by some existing local committee or department.

COMMENTARY ON EDUCATION

Education is one of the chief vehicles by which the long-term solution to our social problems will be found. Inequities in the education system for ghetto dwellers was said by the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to be one of the greatest causes of tension and frustration in the Negro community. Education plays a critical role in helping to integrate the Negro into the mainstream of the life of the community, although as has been pointed out, the schools cannot alone nor overnight overcome the impersonal social and economic forces which have tended to maintain segregation.

It appears that in recent years some real progress has been made by the Department of Education in Kansas City in matters relating to race. Employment statistics show no prejudice in the hiring practices of the Kansas City school system. Forty-five per cent of the increase in teachers and administrative staff last year was filled with Negroes, which brought the total Negro teacher and administrative staff level to approximately twenty-nine per cent.

As of September, 1967, all secondary school faculties had been integrated, while at the elementary school level sixty-four faculties out of the eighty-seven schools in the district were integrated. Since 1965, nineteen elementary school faculties have been integrated.

Progress is also being made in the integration of the student bodies at the individual schools. Only fifteen of the eighty-seven elementary schools in the district have all white students, and five are all black; however, forty-three schools have ninety-five per cent of their student bodies from one race. Of the seven junior high schools, one is ninety-eight per cent white, while two are greater than ninety-nine per cent black. Of the fifteen senior high schools, three are more than ninety-nine per cent white and two are over ninety-nine per cent black. A third high school is ninety per cent black. There does appear to be a limit to further progress in integration of

schools so long as the present pattern of residential segregation continues.

The school board is to be congratulated for conducting meetings open to the public. The frank discussion of school board matters at these public meetings is healthy and is far preferable to private meetings from which the interested public would be excluded.

Despite its progress, the problems of the school system are many. The school system has the human and physical resources to help solve the problems of the inner-city, yet too often these resources are not fully utilized. School facilities in the summertime are open only on a limited basis, and school faculties, the very people who could be helping guide the young Negro, usually have other types of summer jobs that do not capitalize on their teaching abilities. Further, it is noted that often the very best teachers and counselors in the inner-city schools are taken from the schools by promotion to staff positions downtown in the Board of Education. The teacher at the inner-city school is a critically important human link to the Negro student. If the teacher is white, many times he is the only white person with whom the Negro youth is acquainted.

A problem basic to the Kansas City education system is the unique situation of having seventeen separate school districts in the Greater Kansas City area. The Kansas City school district itself covers only one-third of the land area of the city, yet contains almost all the Negro education problems. The efficiency of the existing education system could be greatly improved by broadening the boundaries of the school district, and at the same time, improving the tax base necessary to finance the needs of the school system.

During these complex times, the City needs the positive and imaginative leadership of the School Board. This group has the power to influence the level of tension within the Negro community, and decisions made by the Board are watched very carefully and interpreted by the Negro community as a forecast of the extent of future progress. The School Board is the body which must promote the understanding and knowledge of innovations necessary to solve our

education problems, and is the body which must gain support from within the local community to implement these innovations. The Board should encourage such new and progressive ideas as the middle school concept and the Cluster Plan. The Board should generate other new ideas, such as using the schools in the summertime to educate and train non-students in the inner-city who have had inadequate education or who need to learn new skills.

Compensatory education programs which have been started must be encouraged and broadened both in participation and curriculum. These programs are designed to overcome the handicaps of the ghetto—the lack of home environment and motivation. At the present time only about one-fourth of the students in need of such education are included and only reading skills are taught.

Additional vocational and technical training is needed in Kansas City, particularly for those students who may not go on to college while being quite able to learn a trade. A vocational training center is to be opened soon, after extensive planning. However, it is not believed that current plans can meet the total needs of the Community.

In addition, our junior college system in Kansas City should be geared so as to contribute to the solution of our inner-city problems. It should serve three needs: (1) help prepare people for further college education; (2) teach vocational and technical skills; and (3) train adults in basic education like reading and writing.

Finally, the Commission is pleased to learn that the School Board and the Board of Education officials have made some changes to improve procedures since the experience of April 9 and 10. Now, when the Superintendent is gone from the City, a staff member is vested with full authority to act in his stead. The Commission feels that additional changes and improvements in procedure are in order. For example, there clearly should be better liaison and communication with the City Administration, the Police Department and with the principals of the individual schools. During the civil disturbances in April, important information available from principals and faculty members was not effectively communicated to Administrators at the Board of Education.

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING EDUCATION

The Commission recommends the following:

1. Continuation of current efforts to integrate the faculties and student bodies of all schools to the fullest extent consistent with educational objectives, so as to give all students in the Kansas City school district the opportunity to meet and work with fellow students and teachers who represent the spectrum of the community as a whole.
2. Public school buildings and facilities should be made available during the summer months for both educational and recreational use, particularly by those from the inner-city.
3. School teachers, particularly those who teach at the inner-city schools, should be utilized during the summer months in programs which would capitalize on their teaching abilities and provide additional education for those in need.
4. The boundaries of the existing Kansas City school district should be expanded to include all of Jackson County.
5. The Board of Education should give serious consideration to the adoption of both the Havighurst Plan for construction of a middle school and related facilities, and the Cluster Plan, where it can be utilized. Both of these proposals are designed to stabilize neighborhoods, relieve the serious overcrowded conditions, and achieve maximum integration.
6. The current efforts to provide compensatory education for disadvantaged students should be broadened both as to curriculum and as to the number of students involved in the program.
7. The vocational and technical education training programs should be greatly expanded and coordinated with the types of employment opportunities potentially available to the graduate. This type of training program should be available at both the High School and Junior College level.
8. The Board of Education should seek the cooperation and assistance of local industry and labor unions, both in the planning of the curriculum and in the placement of graduates in jobs.

9. Counsellors for high school students, particularly in the inner-city, should be increased in number. It is suggested that athletic coaches be considered for this type of work.

10. Regular seminars on human relations presented by qualified experts should be conducted for the benefit of all teachers.

11. Better liaison and communication with the City Administration, Police Department and with the principals of the individual schools should be established. Also, a close liaison should be maintained with the Board of Education of Kansas City, Kansas.

12 The school starting time and dismissal time at Central High School and Central Junior High School should be staggered so as to prevent the release of approximately 4,200 students in a one block area at the same time.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY

Governmental Structures

The civil disturbances in April focused attention on the glaring deficiencies in the relationship among the major local governmental institutions. It became apparent during the crisis that these major institutions were separate and autonomous units, without responsibility collectively to a single individual, and without any effective lines of communication with each other. The Kansas City School District, the Kansas City Police Department, the City Government, and the County Government are all separate unrelated components.

At a time when Kansas City so desperately needed a single chief executive officer to whom all could look for guidance, it found the Mayor practically powerless because of an outmoded and outdated structure. Long time friendship and acquaintance among the Mayor, the President of the Board of Police Commissioners, the Chief of Police and the commanding officer of the National Guard was fortuitous, to say the least, because it aided in bringing about the cooperation so desperately needed during the emergency. Had their relations been antagonistic rather than friendly and cooperative, there could easily have been chaos under the divided authority of our cumbersome structure.

The Kansas City School District is responsible to the School Board and their chief executive is the Superintendent of Schools. There appears to have been no consistent channel of communication among the School District, City Hall, and the Police Department.

The Police Department is responsible to the Board of Police Commissioners appointed by the Governor. Although the Mayor is an ex-officio member of the Board of Police Commissioners, his influence with the Department is limited to one vote in five, and he has an effective voice only to the extent that cooperation and friendship give it to him, certainly not because of the structure.

Residents of Kansas City appear to be poorly informed as to

this structure, and consequently many look to the Mayor, to the Superintendent of Schools, to the Chief of Police or to others for decisions that the particular official does not have the authority to make. Two surveys made by the Commission of a sampling of white and black residents from nine census tracts revealed that less than 40% of the black people and 30% of the white people interviewed knew that the Police Department was state controlled and responsible to the Governor's Board of Police Commissioners, rather than to the city government.

Grants Available to the City

The Commission feels that Kansas City probably takes only minimal advantage of the many grants, principally federal in nature, that are available to municipalities. Such grants, from the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Justice, and Health, Education and Welfare, are usually given for one or more years in connection with new and innovative proposals. Sometimes they require matching funds and sometimes not. Since Kansas City is continually short of funds and needed projects may well not be undertaken because of such shortages, this type of grant could provide a means of initiating programs which otherwise might not even be considered. Grants of this sort are important to the City's future in that they facilitate new projects and ideas, but they could not fill the void created by the lack of revenue from which this city suffers. A section of the City Manager's office should have the total City Government responsibility of continually studying the question of what projects are needed and where funds may be available.

City Services, Planning and Housing

The evidence indicates strongly that city services such as trash pickup, maintenance and cleaning of streets, maintenance of parkways, playgrounds and parks and the like, have fallen to a low point. This is particularly noticeable in the inner-city, where the residents are not financially able to provide essential services for themselves. It has been claimed

by some, perhaps validly, that the level of city services in the inner-city is lower than that in other areas. Obviously the deterioration is more apparent there than elsewhere. A minimum standard of services should be established and services should be provided on an equal basis throughout the city.

It is felt to be desirable that when planning for projects in any section of a deprived community is undertaken, residents of that community should be included in the planning. This would give those residents participation in the progress.

Although the time and competence of the members and staff of the Commission made it impossible to study the subject of housing fully and effectively, the Commission did hear and consider enough evidence to know that bad housing is one of the most pervasive grievances of the inner-city. Beyond its immediate effect, it magnifies and intensifies the effects of other dissatisfactions, great and small.

There are many houses in the inner-city which are sub-standard, and this contributes materially to unrest. There should be strict enforcement of housing code requirements. The Commission is advised that at the present time the number of inspectors available for such enforcement is wholly inadequate. While new construction and fair housing opportunities are necessary parts of a total solution to the problem, large numbers of people will still have to depend in the foreseeable future upon existing houses. Thus, the spread of blight must be arrested and the quality of existing housing must be preserved and improved.

In implementing the Fair Housing Ordinance, every effort should be made to destroy the myth that property values must inevitably drop when a Negro moves into a neighborhood. Property values do usually drop because there is usually a mass movement of white people from the neighborhood, thus causing resegregation. It is believed that there would be no appreciable drop in values if the arrival of a Negro family in a neighborhood did not produce such a mass exodus of whites from that area. Thus, in this problem area, all citizens of Kansas City can contribute materially.

Employment and Recreation

It is felt by many that employment is a basic key to the problems of the inner-city. In Kansas City we have approximately 2,500 persons usually referred to as "hard core unemployed." Many of these are school dropouts and young adults who have lived by their wits and on the fruits of criminal activity. Many do not appear on the rolls of the unemployed because they have never been employed. Many have police records, and some are not really interested in working because their standard of living from their unlawful activities is higher than they could expect to attain by working. Thus, in an effort to make these individuals useful members of society, there must be two things accomplished. First, there must be discouragement and prevention of the types of unlawful activity that have provided their livelihood. Secondly, there must be job opportunities for them.

The Commission feels that a strengthening of the fencing laws in Missouri, so that profitable disposition of stolen property would become more difficult, would be an important advancement in attaining the first objective. Missouri should also have conspiracy and immunity statutes similar to the federal statutes, which would make the conviction of those guilty of crime more certain.

As to the second objective, the providing of job opportunities, some success has been achieved both nationally and locally. Nationally, the effort has been headed by the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB), the Urban Coalition, and other groups. Locally, efforts to find jobs for the hard core unemployed have been coordinated primarily by the NAB, the Mayor's Council on Youth Opportunity, the Greater Kansas City Chamber of Commerce, the Coaches Council, governmental employment agencies and numerous civil rights groups. Several thousand job openings have been pledged to be available by June, 1969, and about 600 permanent jobs have already been identified and filled. The principal problem remaining in the Kansas City effort is to assure that the pledges of jobs actually result in the jobs themselves.

However, the employment picture for the hard core un-

employed involves much more than simply finding job openings. Motivation and training of persons not oriented toward "the world of work" must be accomplished. To those who may feel that this is an impossible task, the Commission would point out that the only alternative is wasted human and physical potential, a constant increase in the criminal element and the hard core unemployed, multiplying of welfare costs, and the permanent alienation from society of an ever increasing segment which is inclined toward crime and violence. The Commission feels that every possible effort must be made to integrate these hard core unemployed into the business, economic and social community.

Attention should also be given to the recreational opportunities and facilities available to young people in the inner-city. If their leisure time can be directed toward athletics and other wholesome recreation, there will be less inclination toward criminal activity. This summer, the Coaches Council has been supervising athletics at the inner-city schools for the older youths as well as the younger ones. These facilities and this type program should be carried out on a year-round basis to an extent which will not interfere with normal school activities. The so-called vest pocket parks, Community Centers, and mobile swimming pools are the types of facilities that should be used in order to provide more recreation for the underprivileged youth.

General Hospital

It is a fact that General Hospital is the primary facility available to supply hospital and outpatient care to the underprivileged. Because of lack of finances, it has recently been announced that important inpatient services at General Hospital including the number of hospital beds available must be cut by some 30%. This means that nearly one-third of those needing hospital care who cannot pay will be denied it. This, the Commission feels, is inexcusable, and is again directly traceable to road blocks in the State Legislature which prevent needed funds from being raised.

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING CITY GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS

The Commission recommends the following:

1. The Human Relations Commission of Kansas City should be required to meet regularly. Its leadership as well as membership should consist of persons interested and concerned with problems in human relations, and who can and will devote ample time to its work. It is understood that the present Commission has not met during the past six months at a time when human relations problems have been very critical.

2. The Human Relations Commission of Kansas City, the Fair Housing Commission, and the Public Accommodations Commission should be kept fully staffed and vacancies should be filled promptly. Complaints should be processed and acted upon with dispatch. Delays such as those which have occurred in the past, both in the initial selection of Commission members and in the filling of vacancies, should be avoided in the future. A liaison should be maintained among these Commissions and civil rights groups and organizations within the community.

3. There should be strict enforcement of the Kansas City Building Code so as to stop further deterioration of housing and thus preserve and improve the quality of available housing, particularly in the inner-city. To accomplish this, the number of building inspectors and other staff may have to be substantially increased.

4. Regular city trash pickup must be instituted, and all city services should be maintained above a minimum standard and on an equal basis throughout the city, including the maintenance and cleaning of streets, maintenance of parkways, playgrounds and parks.

5. Public transportation must be improved in order for the underprivileged to be able to go to and from areas where employment may be available.

6. Communications should be improved among City Hall, the Police Department, the Board of Education, and their counterparts in other cities in this metropolitan area, in order to facilitate the exchange of information, particularly in times of emergency.

7. Day nurseries should be established for the care of children of the underprivileged in order to free the mothers to accept employment. Although there are some existing facilities, they are deemed to be wholly inadequate for the needs of this community.

8. There must be increased recreational opportunities and facilities available on a year-round basis for the underprivileged. Vest pocket parks, Community Centers, mobile swimming pools, and the use of public school gymnasiums by non-students are among the types of things that should be utilized.

9. A section should be established in the City Manager's office to make a continuing study of projects needed and where funds may be available from Federal grants, or otherwise.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission recommends the following:

1. The current programs for jobs, including motivation and training programs, should be continued and expanded. This must be recognized as a responsibility of industry as well as government, and must have the cooperation of the labor unions. The efforts of all should be coordinated.
2. The State Legislature should enact strengthened fencing laws which will result in the conviction of those who live from the profits of property stolen by others, and thus make disposition of stolen property in the Kansas City area more difficult and less profitable.
3. The State Legislature should enact conspiracy and immunity statutes similar to the federal statutes in order to facilitate the conviction of those guilty of crime.
4. Investigation should be made into charges often heard in testimony before the Commission that some merchants and businesses in the inner-city area charge excessive prices and usurious interest. Excessive prices are alleged to take the form of charging a higher price in the inner-city than is charged in other sections of the City for the same item, or charging the same price for inferior quality.
5. All citizens of Kansas City must recognize the crying need for adequate funds to be supplied for the operation of the City Government, the Police Department and General Hospital. This need must be conveyed and emphasized to the Governor, to the State Legislature, and particularly to the State Legislators from Jackson County.

CONCLUSION

The function of this Commission ceases with the making of this report to the people of Kansas City. Often, a group such as this Commission devotes much time and study to a problem only to have their report mark the end of any tangible effort to rectify the problem. This Commission feels that if harmonious relations are to be established in Kansas City, the recommendations made in this report must be implemented to the fullest extent possible. To this end, the Commission recommends to the Mayor that a Task Force consisting of persons of authority from each of the major institutions of government, and representatives from the community at large, be appointed to consider priorities among the recommendations made herein as well as means to implement them. This Task Force should report progress publicly at such reasonable intervals as may be designated.

Respectfully submitted,

MAYOR'S COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

By

DAVID R. HARDY, *Chairman*

ROBERT P. INGRAM, *Member*

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APPENDIX "A"

RACISM

This Commission has developed a series of recommendations which if followed should help bring about improvements in economic status, education and police-Negro relationships. However, there is one matter, perhaps most important of all, but which is not as tangible and cannot be put in the form of a concrete recommendation. This matter is the necessity for all citizens to recognize the concept of human dignity for all men regardless of skin color or ethnic background.

The President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded that "our nation is moving toward two societies; one black, one white—separate and unequal" and that Commission referred to the root of the racial problems as lying in a deepseated racism which permeates American society.

Since racism is a term heretofore reserved for the extremely biogoted person performing blatant discriminatory acts, it is shocking to many white Americans to be told that they are actively and consistently supporting the maintenance of social and economic inequality of black people.

White racism does not mean that every white person is looking for the opportunity to help exterminate black people. It does mean, however, that the large majority, consciously or unconsciously, do believe in the concept of white superiority. It is the behavior of white persons based on this concept which robs the black person of any semblance of human dignity. Negroes in Kansas City point to two examples of this behavior from the recent civil disorder;

1. They believe that the police failed to distinguish law-abiding Negroes from law-breaking Negroes; treating all Negroes as if they were criminals.
2. Many individual Negroes were asked by white persons, "What do you people want?" This question shows a failure

to recognize that there are individual differences, needs and desires among Negroes, just as there are among white people.

Racism as defined here exists in Kansas City and the institutions which comprise this city. However, it is undoubtedly true that the degree of racism in any agency, department, or organization of this city (the Police Department for example) is only a reflection of the degree of the racism within the entire Kansas City Community.

Nevertheless this attitude of white superiority must be recognized, understood, and corrected before any meaningful long term progress in the community's race relations can be expected.

The basis for this racist attitude of superiority was established in the history of this nation beginning with slavery and continuing through more than a hundred years of quasi-freedom. To justify the disenfranchisement of human rights during the period of slavery in the Dutch-English slavery tradition, black persons were defined as chattels and "things". Certain beliefs and stereotypes were created and maintained as part of this dehumanizing process in order to deny any resemblance between black slaves and white owners. This same process called for a degradation of anything black and glorification of anything white. For instance, note that we generally use the word "black" in a derogatory manner, as in "black sheep, blackball, and blackmail."

Slavery ended with the Civil War, but since there was virtually no change in attitude, it did not mark the beginning of freedom for the Negro. Today, these same attitudes and stereotypes continue in varying degrees to exist and permeate American society.

Changing this situation is primarily an individual effort which begins with the admission to oneself that this prejudice is held, an admission as difficult to most white people as it is for the alcoholic to admit the cause of his problem. With this self-evaluation begun, white persons can then start to hear more accurately and unemotionally what black people are saying. Concepts such as "black power" are not as ominous and frightening as many tend to believe. In truth, such concepts represent the agonizing, sometimes awkward,

attempts to establish self-identity. This is not easy for the black man, since he has no guidelines from his American heritage other than the depersonalizing, dehumanizing ones that began with his ancestors.

Moreover, it is a misconception to say that these black power advocates and other black militants hate all white persons. In fact, in Kansas City many white persons living in the inner-city were not harmed and the establishments of many white merchants, considered fair businessmen, were not burned or looted. What is hated, however, is the "system", and those who maintain it, which has prevented the Negro from achieving the place in America that he has been led to believe is open to him.

As indicated above, the responsibility of every individual in this area is great, but assistance should also come from churches, service clubs, school districts, departments of the city government, industry, the Chamber of Commerce, and other institutions and organizations which are dedicated to the improvement of our community. It would seem that churches in particular have the potential to be the greatest force for change in society in the area of human relations and the elimination of racial prejudice. Many of them have been dilatory in attacking this problem despite the fact that the national conferences of most religious bodies have moved to integrate and to achieve the ideal of equality in human rights. It obviously has been far easier to plan and formulate ideas on a national level than it has been to implement these ideas locally. Kansas City is fortunate in having many religious leaders, Jewish, Catholic and Protestant, who have been most active in efforts to eliminate discrimination and prejudice. There are also many individual church members equally committed. But, there is much yet to be accomplished.

APPENDIX "B"

PROFILES OF THE APRIL, 1968, RIOT VICTIMS

1. MAYNARD GOUGH:

Maynard Gough, who was fatally shot by a policeman on April 9, 1968, was born in Kansas City, Missouri, about 31 years ago. Knowledge of his background is limited since he does not have a known close relative in Kansas City, and since he did not talk much about his past to friends.

He had been ill most of his life, suffering from sickle cell anemia, a hereditary disease common to Negroes, which usually limits life expectancy to less than 30 years.

Gough spent most of the last eight years of his life at General Hospital, both as a patient and as an orderly. Gough became dependent on pain killing drugs. He had indicated fatalistically to friends that he would not die from his disease, but rather from some other cause.

2. CHARLES "SHUGG" MARTIN:

Charles "Shugg" Martin who was fatally shot by a policeman on April 10, 1968, was born in Kansas City in 1924. He was the oldest of twelve children, six girls and six boys. He attended Douglas R. T. Coles grade school and Lincoln High School where he dropped out in the 11th grade. He was married at 18 years of age, was divorced and never remarried. He enlisted in the U. S. Army and after serving 4 years, received a Dishonorable Discharge. He tried unsuccessfully to be a professional football player and a boxer.

From 1944 to his death, he compiled an extensive criminal record. He was unable to hold a job and was a confirmed alcoholic for a number of years before his death.

3. GEORGE EDWARD McKINNEY, SR.:

George E. McKinney, Sr., who was fatally shot at the height of the riot on April 10, 1968, by an unknown person was born in St. Joseph, Missouri, in 1918. He was the youngest

of nine children, seven boys, two girls. McKinney dropped out of high school after completing the 11th grade and got married in 1944. He and his wife had ten children, and several grandchildren living in the home.

McKinney's work record is vague; however, he did wash windows from time to time, but did not hold a steady job. For income, the McKinneys depended on a disability check he received, and aid-to-dependent children checks which his wife was receiving. However, the amount was not enough to support the large family which lived in poverty.

McKinney became a part-time Baptist minister. He was a religious person, and encouraged his children to go to school. Mrs. McKinney, Sr., is now left with the responsibility of taking care of 16 people in the household. The family financial situation is very poor.

4. GEORGE EDWARD McKINNEY, JR.:

George Edward McKinney, Jr., born on March 30, 1952, in Kansas City was fatally shot on April 10, 1968, while with his father in the vicinity of the Byron Hotel.

He was the third of ten children. He was attending Central Junior High School where he was considered an average student. Like his father, he was very religious. At school he participated in wrestling, football, basketball and baseball.

5. JULIUS PRESTON HAMILTON:

Julius Preston Hamilton who was fatally shot by a policeman on April 10, 1968, was born in Kansas City in 1929. He was the oldest of 7 children, two girls and five boys. He attended Lincoln High School, and upon graduation enrolled in a bricklaying training program. He completed his training successfully and joined the Bricklayers Local Union No. 4. He worked steadily as a bricklayer for 18 years until his death.

Hamilton and his wife were married for 18 years, having been friends since childhood. They had 2 children. He was an excellent bowler, having won a number of tournaments, and also liked to fish and hunt. He was a shy, quiet man who kept to himself but was cordial with his neighbors.

Having worked steadily, Hamilton was able to leave his wife and children in a good financial condition.

6. ALBERT DANIEL MILLER, JR.:

Albert Daniel Miller, Jr., who was fatally shot by a policeman on April 10, 1968, was born on January 29, 1948. Albert was the oldest of eight children, having four brothers and three sisters. His parents separated when he was eight years old. Miller lived without his father throughout the rest of his life.

He did poorly in school, and at the age of 14 dropped out of Manual High School. He was sent to a Boys' Home where he stayed for 8 months. Upon his release, he became involved in stealing cars, and at the age of 15 years was sent to Boonville Reformatory for 2 years. Afterwards, he worked for one of the poverty programs in Kansas City and later the City Water Department. He tried to enlist in the U. S. Army but was rejected. He was employed at the time of his death.

APPENDIX "C"

Results of Attitude and Riot Reaction Surveys

In order to gain insight into the attitudes held by the average Kansas Citian and his reaction to the April disturbance, the Commission had two surveys conducted in nine census tracts chosen to represent the various types of neighborhoods in the metropolitan area. The survey of white residents was conducted by Dr. Daniel U. Levine, Associate Director, Center for the Study of Metropolitan Problems in Education, University of Missouri at Kansas City, and his staff, with some interview assistance from Midwest Research Institute. The survey of Negro residents was conducted by Mr. Robert Jones, Director of Niles Home for Children, and his associates, all recognized in the area of social work. The Commission deeply appreciates the time and effort donated by these people.

Due to limited time and resources, the sample used in these surveys could not be selected to give an exact cross section of the metropolitan area, but the sample was large and diverse enough to reflect trends in attitudes and perception. The questionnaire consisted of 32 items, and since the interviews took place during the day, about 75% of the respondents were female. Almost half of the respondents were between 30 and 50 years of age, about 70% lived in Kansas City ten years or more, and almost all were in town during the disturbance.

Over half of the white respondents used the words "annoyed" and "tense" to describe their reaction to the disturbance. 46% were "confused," but about the same number were also "more aware of problems." Only 35% were surprised.

White people generally thought the single most important cause of the disturbance was "radical leaders and instigators" (33%), while the second choice (12%) was "just wanted to destroy." Other answers such as lack of economic opportunity, frustration of aspirations, school deficiencies, poor housing, difficulties with police and lack of dignified treatment were

mentioned by white people but were not considered by many to be the single most important cause of the disturbance.

Did the riot help relieve the Negro's plight? 73% of the whites said "probably or definitely no." 48% of the Negroes said the same thing, but 40% of the Negroes said "probably or definitely yes." Negroes who said the riot definitely did not help indicated that it was Negro lives that were lost and mainly Negro property that was damaged. Negroes who said the riot did help indicated that the riot made white people more aware of Negro problems.

Negroes indicated a greater awareness that the Governor "is the boss or is in charge of the Chief of Police and the Police Board." 40% knew this, but only 27% of the whites answered correctly. Considerably fewer of both races knew anything about the structure of the School Board and the Board of Education.

White people do not believe that the police mistreated "many" non-rioting Negroes. 65% said "not true or probably not true." However, almost half of the white people were willing to believe that a "few" nonrioting Negroes were mistreated by the Police, but 34% said even this was "not true or probably not true."

Several questions regarding the general attitude of one race toward the other were also asked. 52% of the white people agreed, at least a little, with the statement "Rather than protesting about things they don't like, Negroes first should earn the rights of American citizens," perhaps indicating that a substantial number of whites feel citizenship rights are earned and are not freedoms which a citizen exercises. Whites generally feel Negroes in Kansas City are treated fairly—58% yes, 12% no; on the other hand, only 19% of the Negroes felt Negroes in Kansas City were treated fairly, and 47% said the treatment was unfair.

Do riots help in the long run? Most of the Negroes (68%) said "yes or probably yes"; but most of the whites (67%) said "no or probably no." A few whites (28%) said "yes or probably yes"; and a few Negroes (27%) said "no or probably no."

In conclusion, trends evident from the surveys indicate that white respondents do not perceive the April disturbance

arising from legitimate grievances. This trend is compatible with research following the 1967 Chicago riot as well as Harris and Gallup polls. Further, trends here indicate Negro respondents disagree substantially with white respondents on such important issues as fair treatment of Kansas City Negroes and the long run benefit of riots. Since white respondents live in predominantly white areas, and Negro respondents live in predominantly Negro areas, there is little chance for either group to have its opinions modified by contact with the other.